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Abstract
With today’s system-on-chip (SOC) technology, we are able to design larger and
more

complicated

application-specific

integrated

circuits

(ASICs)

and

field

programmable gate array (FPGA) in shorter time period. The key point o f the
success o f SOC technology is the reuse of intellectual property (IP) cores.
Consequently the copyright protection for these IP cores becomes the major concern
for the development pace of SOC technology.

W atermarking technology has been proved to be an effective way of copyright
protection. In this thesis, the author presents two new watermarking algorithms
respectively at algorithm level and FPGA layout level. The simulations and
implementation results show that the new proposals have much less design and
hardware implementation overheads, lower watermark embedding and extraction
cost, as well as higher security strength, compared to the previously proposed
methods.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1. Research Motivations
In the past decade there has been an explosion in the use and distribution o f digital
contents such as music, movies, electronic books, software, etc, over Internet. Electronic
commerce applications and online services have also grown rapidly. But at the same time,
digital products and services providers concern themselves about the unrestricted
duplication and dissemination o f copyrighted materials [1][2]. For example, the lack o f
effective protection methods for copyright content was the main reason for the delayed
introduction o f Digital Video Disks (DVDs) [1], Two complementary technologies have
been developed as countermeasures against copyright violation, one is encryption and the
other is watermarking [1].

More recently, watermarking has been shown as an effective way to protect intellectual
property (IP) o f hardware design. In the past few years, the system-on-chip (SOC)
technology has made it possible and efficient to design complicated DSP ASICs and
FPGAs. The main reason o f the success o f the SOC technology is the reuse o f IP cells.
The copyright protection for the IP cells becomes a vital issue for further development o f
the SOC technology. Encryption technology can provide copyright protection during the
transmission o f the IP cells from the vendor to the customer. It is obvious that encryption
is not enough for the complete IP protection since there is no protection for the IP cells at
the customer's end after the customer receives and decrypts the encrypted IP cells.
Watermarking technology has been used to complement encryption by embedding a piece
o f secret information into the original data to generate the watermarked data. It is
assumed that the watermarked data still keep their proper content or function and this
secret information cannot be removed from the watermarked data without damaging the
proper content/function of the data.

1
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Several watermarking schemes for DSP algorithms and/or their ASIC/FPGA designs have
been presented since late 1990's [3][4][5][6][7][8][9][[10][11]. However, many o f the
watermarking schemes have been shown not secure by recent proposals o f attacking
schemes [8] and not efficient due to large overheads and performance degradation
[3][[9][10][11]. Many IP vendors do not use any watermarking scheme and are still trying
to find an efficient enough watermarking scheme to be used for the customer's end.
Market leaders o f ASIC CAD tool and IP providers like Cadence and Synopsys have built
up

research

teams

focusing

on

ASIC

IP's

watermarking

technology

[4][12][13][14][15][16],

Two pieces o f research work have been proposed in this thesis. Firstly, we apply the
method o f modifying the least significant bit (LSB) to FIR filter and some other DSP
algorithms. The simulation results show that the watermarked filter/DSP algorithms have
very low magnitude distortion. Secondly, a novel watermarking scheme at FPGA layout
layer is proposed. It provides IP protection for FPGA design by utilizing the location
information o f the used FPGA cells. Compared to the previous methods for FPGA, the
proposed watermarking scheme has extremely low overheads and high security strength.

1.2. The Organization of Thesis
There are five chapters in this thesis. In Chapter 1, the motivation o f developing new DSP
algorithms' FPGA watermarking scheme is given. Chapter 2 introduces watermarking
technology, watermarking application fields and requirements, current ASIC/FPGA as
well as DSP algorithms' watermarking technologies. Chapter 3 presents the filter
coefficients' LSB watermarking scheme. Chapter 4 proposes the FPGA cell locations'
watermarking scheme. Several FPGA IPs, like FIR filter, comb filter, Code Division
Multiple Access (CDMA) match filter, discrete cosine transform (DCT) IPs are used to
verify the performance o f watermarking scheme. The comparisons between the FPGA
cell location modification watermarking scheme and the current available DSP algorithms
as well as ASIC/FPGA watermarking schemes are also given in chapter 4. Conclusions
are drawn in chapter 5 based on the simulation and analysis presented in the previous
chapters. Several possible future work directions are also mentioned.
2
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Chapter2:
Review o f Watermarking Technology

In this chapter, we introduce the concepts o f watermarking and information hiding
technologies. Then the application fields and general requirements for watermarking
technology are discussed. Finally, a review o f the current ASIC/FPGA as well as DSP
algorithms' watermarking schemes is given. A few watermarking attack methods are also
introduced.

2.1.Watermarking Technology Basics
2.1.1. Current Copyright Protection Technologies
Great effort has been made for copyright protection in the past years. We have seen some
legislation act like Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which was effective on October
28,1998, in U.S.A [1]. The European Union is also preparing similar intellectual property
rights protection for digital multimedia products [1]. To provide copyright protection for
digital data, two complemented methods have been developed: encryption and
watermarking.

Encryption technology can be used to protect digital data during the transmission from
the sender to the receiver. After the receiver has obtained the encrypted data and
decrypted it, the decrypted data is no longer protected. Unauthorized copies may be made
from the decrypted data. For example, after downloading the music files from the Internet,
the customer can use the given key to decrypt the music files and make copies by himself,
and then gives them to his friends. The encryption technology cannot protect the
copyright anymore [1],

Watermarking techniques can be used to complement encryption by embedding secret
information, which is imperceptible to the receiver, called watermark, into the original
3
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data. Watermark is a piece o f information embedded within other objects that shows the
identity o f copyright owner. Watermarks tell us who is the owner o f the IP for the object
[1][2]. Watermarking is an old technology that has been used for centuries. This
technology was firstly developed to protect valuable paper documentations, like bank
notes, commercial contracts as well as cash. In this thesis, the discussion o f watermarking
technology will be limited to the digital watermarking field. For example, if a customer
violates copyright protection by making illegal copies o f a watermarked image and freely
distributing them among his friends, then the original copyright owner can suit this
customer and show the copyright information embedded in the image as the watermark in
the court [1][2].

2.1.2. Watermarking as a Sub-field of Information Hiding
Figure 1 Classification o f Information Hiding Technology [2]
■Information Hiding
Covert |
Channels

Steganography

Anonymity

Linoustic T e c h n i c a l R o b u s t
steganography
steganography
copyright marking

Fingerprinting

Copyright marking

Fragile
watermarking

Watermarking

Imperceptible
watermarking

Visible
watermarking

Information hiding includes covert channels, steganography, anonymity and copyright
marking, see Figure 1. Covert Channels means the hidden secret channels used by two
parties for communication. Anonymity is the technology that investigates the hiding o f
information sender's true name. Steganography means hiding information in other
information. This is the technology to conceal the existence o f information within other
data [2]. Steganography is different from Cryptography. Cryptography is the technology

4
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to protect the content o f messages. People use encryption algorithms to encrypt data and
use decryption algorithms to decrypt the encrypted data [2].

We can see there are two subsets under copyright marking, one is robust copyright
marking and the other is fragile watermarking. Robust copyright watermark is the
watermark that is infeasible to be removed or modified without destroying the object at
the same time [2].
Fragile watermark is the watermark that will be destroyed as soon as the object is
modified too much [2]. We can see that the watermarking technology belongs to robust
copyright marking. Watermarking is the technology or procedure to embed a digital
watermark into a digital IP and detect/extract it from the digital IP that has been
watermarked [2].
Fingerprinting technology also belongs to robust copyright marking. Fingerprint is the
serial number information hidden in the original data. Fingerprinting is the technology or
procedure to embed fingerprint into the original digital IP and detect/extract it from the
digital IP that has been fingerprinted [2]. Fingerprints can enable the intellectual property
owners to identify which customer broke his license agreement and supplied the property
to unauthorized third parties [2].

This thesis focuses on the imperceptible watermarking method since imperceptible
watermark will arouse less suspicion and attacks. Until recently, information hiding
technology received much less attention from the research community and industry than
cryptography (encryption belongs to cryptography). But this condition has changed. The
first academic conference on the watermarking subject was organized in 1996 [2]. The
main driving strength is concern over copyright protection. Law enforcement and counter
intelligence agencies are also very interested in understanding these technologies so as to
detect and trace hidden copyright and serial number information [2]. In this area rapid
strides are being made constantly but general theories are still very tentative.

Copyright marking, as opposed to Steganography, has some additional requirement o f
robustness against possible attacks. Copyright marks can be either visible or invisible,
5
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depending on the specific application case. But most o f the literature has focused on
invisible

(or transparent) digital watermarks

that have wider applications

[2],

Watermarking in paper is a very old anti-counterfeiting technology; more recent
innovations include special ultraviolet (UV) fluorescent inks used in printing traveler's
cheques. In this paper, the discussion will focus on digital watermarking techniques.

2.1.3.Watermarking Application Fields
The watermarking technology can be used for the following purposes:
Copyright Protection: The owner can embed a watermark with copyright information in
the original data. Under the condition that there is any copyright argument or copyright
violation, the original owner can show the copyright information within the watermark to
the judge at court [1][2].
Fingerprinting'. The copyright owner or IP vender also can embed different watermarks
called fingerprints in the copies submitted to different customers. So they can trace the
source o f illegal copies [1][3][5]. For example, the music publisher can embed different
serial number to the CDs that will be sold by different retail agents in different countries.
If the music publisher finds some illegal copies o f the CD products, the publisher can
trace the source o f the illegal copy by extracting the watermark.
Copy Protection: The watermark information can stop the copy procedure during
unauthorized copy. For example, for some software, there are copy protection codes
embedded. When the customer try to make illegal copies, these copy protection bits will
make the computer to stop execute the copy instructions [1],
Authentication: Fragile watermarks (watermarks that will be modified or removed
without difficulty with the modification o f the original data) can be used to check the
authenticity o f the data. The author o f the electronic books can embed large amount- o f
fragile watermarks into the whole electronic book. So if some o f the watermarks have
been removed, that means some sections o f the books have been alternated [ 1].

2.1.4.Watermarking Embedding and Extraction Schemes
The watermarking procedure is to add watermark that contains copyright information into
the original data by using watermark embedding algorithms. The embedded data are the

6
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message that one wishes to send secretly. Sometimes secret or public keys are also used
to encrypt the original copyright information. The key is used to control the hiding
processing so as to restrict detection and/or recovery o f the embedded data to parties who
know it [2]. After applying the watermarking algorithm we will have the marked data
with watermark inside.
Figure 2 Watermark Embedding scheme [2]
Watermark

Original IP

Embedding

Marked IP

algorithm
Key (optional)

Figure 3 Watermark Extraction Scheme [2]
Mark and/or Original IP

Test IP

Detection

Watermark/confidence measure

algorithm
Key (optional)
In Figure 3, the watermark inside the IP will be extracted. Let us use the digital photo
image as an example. The watermark extraction procedure is to use the watermark and
the original image, as well as the image that will be tested. After comparing the original
image and the image under test, we can find the watermark inside the tested image, which
is the copyright confidence. Other watermark extraction methods are similar to this
scheme.

2.1.5.General Watermarking Requirements
A few general requirements for a watermarking scheme have been proposed [1][2][3][4]:
7
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Perceptual Transparency: A watermark is imperceptible if humans cannot distinguish the
original data and the data with watermark. Since by comparing the original data and the
watermarked data, people can easily find the difference, that is the watermark, we should
assume that the customer does not have access to the original data [1].
Payload o f the Watermark: This is the amount o f the information that can be stored in a
watermark. For specific data object, if we can embed more information into the original
data, we say this watermark-embedding scheme has higher payload. A good watermarkembedding scheme should provide high payload [1].
Robustness: This refers to the difficulty to remove/modify the watermark without
degrading or changing the original data. To remove the watermark, the potential attacker
should firstly try to find the watermark. If the watermark is very hard to find, very hard to
forgery and very hard to remove, we say that this kind o f watermarking scheme has good
robustness [1][2][3]. To remove or modify the watermark must require the knowledge o f
a secret, like the secret key value, the watermarking procedure and watermarking
algorithm details. The watermark should survive all attacks that do not degrade the IP's
perceived

quality.

Some

attacks

include

re-sampling,

re-quantization,

dithering,

compression and the combination of them.
Security: The security o f watermarking scheme means the watermarking scheme's ability
against watermark detection/forgery/modification. We should assume that the method to
encrypt and watermark the data is known to the public and the security must lie in the
choice o f a key [1].
Independency: If multiple marks are inserted in a single object, then they should not
interfere each other.

Most watermarking applications have a sharp tradeoff between robustness and watermark
embedding efficiency.

This make a single watermarking

scheme meeting the

requirements o f all applications to be difficult [2]. At the other side, most real case
applications do not require all o f the properties for general watermarking schemes.

2.2.ASIC and FPGA Watermarking Technology
2.2.1. Where We Need to Add Watermark
8
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Figure 4 SOC Design Flow and Different Forms of IP Blocks [17]

SOC Design Flow and Different Forms of IP Blocks
System Level Design(Co-design Level)

ecture.

‘A lgol luuuic
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System Level Model

I*lfffsl§
Software Specific atkm

ardware Specification

lodin

JLTL Implementation
RTL ModelfSoft IP)

Gate ModeK Firm IP)

m m m m :Layout(Hard IP)
A watermark can be added at different levels such as algorithm level, architecture level,
register level, layout level, etc. At a lower level, payload is usually higher. A watermark
can be added at multiple levels to make an attack even harder.

Figure 4 shows the current SOC design flow and different types o f IP blocks that need to
be protected. For each level, there should be different copyright protection schemes. For
watermarking technology, the watermarking schemes o f these IPs locating at different
levels are also different. The watermark embedded at the higher level will be carried to
the lower levels. For example, if we add watermark to the RTL model (soft IP), the
watermark will be carried to the lower levels, like gate level and layout level. This is the
reason we prefer to add watermark to the design level as high as possible. The reason is if
any attacker wants to remove the watermark and get the high level design, he needs to
remove the watermark embedded at each lower level, if the attacker can only access the
lowest level o f IPs.

9
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The watermark embedded at higher level is often easy to be identified and removed, if the
IP is provided with high-level form modules. Human beings normally will feel much
easier to understand high-level design data. For example, the attacker will feel more
comfortable to understand the structure o f the software program written in C or Java,
comparing to the layout data o f all binary format (FPGA bit-stream programming data or
ASIC layout data).

2.2.2. The Importance of ASIC/FPGA IP Watermarking
The fast development o f system-on-chip technology increases the importance o f IP reuse.
Now we can integrate the complete system on a single silicon chip that has all the
functions o f those chips on a printed board produced several years ago. Reusable virtual
components or IP blocks are most effective for the purpose o f reducing design cycle time,
as well as decreasing design risk. IP owners want to make sure that their IP products will
not be illegally redistributed. Consumers also want to make sure that the IPs they buy are
legitimate. FPGAs become good candidates for fast-to-market products like DSP cores
for wireless communication and computer network applications. Distribution o f the IP
cores through the Internet is the commercial fact but it also increases the risk o f IPs being
stolen and forgery [17]. The IP provider can use some technologies like JAVA applets
and JHDL to protect their IPs during the evaluation o f the IPs by potential customers.
Based on the JHDL design tool, these JAVA applets allow structure viewing, circuit
simulation and netlist generation for some cases. Applets can be customized to provide
varying levels o f visibility and functionality [18].

Watermark technology is also needed for AISC/FPGA co-design and co-verification,
which means from the right beginning there should be considerations for the integration
o f different types o f design blocks (including software codes, digital blocks, analog
blocks, as well as IPs with the form o f Very-high-speed Integrated Circuit Hardware
Description Language (VHDL)/Verilog source code, black box schematic block or layout
hard blocks) [17][19]. There should be copyright protection schemes for all these kinds o f
design IPs.

10
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IP vendors can protect their copyright by encrypting their source codes (VHDL/Verilog)
when these codes are sent to the buyers. These modules can be loaded into authorized
simulators or synthesis tools without making the source code visible to the system
designer who uses the IP blocks. In this case, the CAD tool maintains the safety o f the
copyright. But in practice, this protection is often broken with attacking the CAD tool
(simulators, synthesis tool) directly. We need to find extra methods to protect the design
IPs. Watermarking technology has shown its ability for ASIC/FPGA IP protection.

The methods o f watermarking for digital images, music and video are quite different from
the methods to protect DSP algorithms and ASIC/FPGA designs. The research about the
DSP algorithm and ASIC/FPGA watermarking just began several years ago and still is a
relatively new area. But we can see this area begin attract more researchers and some
market leader ASIC/FPGA design software companies like Cadence that also begins to
support such kind o f research activities.

2.2.3. ASIC/FPGA Watermarking Evaluation Criteria
Watermarking is a process that hides or embeds data into a design IP that can help deter
theft and counterfeiting. The watermark serves as evidence o f ownership. A complete
ASIC/FPGA IP protection scheme based on watermarking consists o f two phases:
watermark synthesis and watermark detection [4] [12].

The synthesis phase is fully characterized by [4]:
(a) Algorithms translating design features onto a unique watermark
(b) Tr: the worst case time required to forge and/delete the watermark
(c) Pu: the odds that a design carries an unintended watermark in part or in its totality. -

The detection phase is characterized by [4]:
(d) Pm: the probability o f a detection miss
(e) Pf=Pu: the probability o f a false alarm.

Typical specification o f a complete IP protection scheme could be [4]:
11
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Tr

> = 2 years,

Pu=Pf

<= IE-30

Pm

<= IE-6

To evaluate certain ASIC/FPGA and DSP algorithms' watermarking scheme, some major
factors need to be considered. The following factors have combined the requirements
presented in [4][12] as well as the general requirements for watermarking schemes [1][2].
These evaluation criteria will be used in the following chapters.

Embedding Efficiency: This item shows the watermarking schemes' efficiency. For
example for the same filter, watermarking scheme A can embed maximum 8-bit
information and watermarking scheme B can embed 16-bit information, we say
watermarking scheme B has better embedding efficiency.
Embedding Cost'. This item reflects the effect o f the watermarking procedure on the
original ASIC/FPGA or DSP algorithm. If the watermarking scheme introduces
comparatively small timing delay increase, hardware cost increase, algorithm complexity
and/or software computational time's increase, we say this scheme has low embedding
cost.
Design Overhead'. This item shows the extra time for the design with watermarking steps.
If the watermarking steps will add small extra design time, we say this watermarking
scheme has low design overhead.
Extraction Cost: This one is related to the difficulty, complicity, as well as the time o f
watermark extraction. If the extraction procedure needs less effort, for example, does not
need complicate test equipments, people having strong electronics background or extra
software, we will say this scheme's watermark extraction cost is low.
Extraction Miss Probability. This is the probability that a watermark cannot be extracted.
This item equals to Pm.
Probability o f Coincidence: This item shows the probability that one watermarked IP will
carry the whole or partial watermark as another IP that has not been watermarked. The
smaller this number, the better. Normally this number should be less than IE-30 for
copyright protection applications. This item equals to Pu and Pf.

12
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Security Strength: This item shows the watermarking scheme's ability against potential
attacker's attempt o f detecting, counterfeiting and remove o f the watermark. The higher
the ability, the better the security strength. Also the more transparent the watermark, the
better the security strength. The value o f Tr is one o f the indications o f this specification.
Applied Area: This item is related to the application fields o f the watermarking scheme.
Some watermark schemes can be used for ASICs' IP protection, others are for FPGAs
only. Some are for digital designs and others are for analog designs. The wider the
applied area, the better the watermarking schemes.

2.3. Filter Watermarking Schemes
The following three filter watermarking schemes have been proposed: filter magnitude
modification, filter tap’s equal-replacement and windowing function watermarking. In
this section, the watermarking procedures and the major properties o f these three schemes
are mentioned.

2.3.1. Filter Magnitude Modification [9]:
Firstly, the designer separates the filter stop or pass-band to several equal width zones
(i.e., seven zones). Then he modifies the filter magnitude response according to the
watermark bits. If the bit is 1, he will decrease the filter magnitude response by x dB
(here x is a small number like 0.1). If the bit is 0, he will increase the filter magnitude
response by x dB. After that, he uses the modified filter magnitude response as the design
constrains input to the design tool. Finally he obtains the filter coefficients. Now the
filter's magnitude response decided by the new coefficients will contain the watermark
information that is 7-bit as 0110101.
Figure 5 The Magnitude Response of the Filter with 7-bit Watermark [9]:

13
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Watermarking performance analysis for filter magnitude modification scheme:
The embedding efficiency is less than 8 bit/31taps—0.258 bit/tap. The authors do not give
out clear number o f the maxim number o f watermark bits, which can be hidden into the
filter's magnitude response. But the authors do mention that for the hiding o f 7-bit
watermark, the 31-tap filter is not long enough in terms o f filter tap number. The filter
with 41-taps can be used to embed such 7-bit watermarks. Since the authors divide the
filter's pass band's magnitude response and modify the magnitude response, the filter's
order may increase. But the authors o f [9] do not mention other simulation results with
more watermarking bits, the author o f this thesis can not exactly evaluate the relation
between the watermark length and the filter's order, as well as the hardware cost increase.
There is 7% hardware increase for the embedding o f 7-bit watermark at algorithm level
only.

From [9], the designer needs to re-design the filter for embedding the watermark. So the
design overhead is high. The authors o f this paper do not mention the watermark
extraction flow. It seems that we can plot out the filter's magnitude response and check
the magnitude response, then find the watermark bits related to the magnitude ripples.
And if the original filter already has magnitude ripples in pass-band, it will be more
difficult to extract the watermark from its magnitude response.

The authors o f paper [9] do not provide any information about the possible attack mode
analysis and security strength analysis. The filter performance degradation is related to
the filter magnitude change value. If the filter magnitude change decreases, the filter
performance degradation will decrease, but the filter taps number will increase. This
scheme adds watermark at algorithm level, the highest level for filter design, so it is hard
to be removed from lower level o f filter’s implementation, like logic, layout or circuit
level. This watermarking scheme increases the complexity o f filter design. It also
increases the order o f the filer, since we introduce new ripple constrains to the filter
magnitude response, As a result, the hardware cost increases by +7%.

14
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2.3.2. Filter Tap’s Equal Function Replacement Method [9]
The designer firstly designs the filter with the original performance specification then he
replaces the filter taps by using equal filter structure replacement. There are three equal
function filter structures, A, B and C. W hen the watermarking bit is 0, the designer will
use B to implement this tap. When the watermarking bit is 1, the designer will use C to
implement this tap. When there is no watermark to be embedded, the designer will keep
on using A.
Figure 6 Filter Equal Function Replacement [9]
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Watermarking performance analysis:
Since the author can use one tap to embed one bit o f watermark information, the
embedding efficiency is 1 bit/tap. After watermarking, the hardware area increases by
29%, which is primarily due to a higher internal word length. The higher word length is
the result o f dividing coefficients introduced by equal filter tap function replacements.
The increase o f hardware area will also increase the power consumption o f the filter,
since we increase the amount o f operations introduced by dividing operations. The design
o f the filter with watermark needs to replace the standard filter taps with equal functional
tap module. This introduces the non-regularity for the filter's hardware design and will
increase the time and effort o f VHDL coding.

The authors o f the paper do not mention the details o f how to extract the watermark. The
extraction o f the watermark needs the extractor to review the filter's implementation
layout or logic circuit design or VHDL/Verilog source code, extract the logic functions o f
15
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the filter and extract the watermark according to the equal function replacement
watermarking rules. This will require considerable time and effort. The probability o f
coincidence o f this kind will be zero if only the author o f that paper uses this
watermarking method. Since the tap structure o f the filters will be all the same if the filter
is designed in traditional way.

The authors do not mention the security strength o f this method. Layout reverse
engineering may be able to remove this kind o f watermark, as long as the layout
processing technology is visible by the attacker (normally 0.5um or wider metal wire
width). This method can be applied to both ASIC and FPGA design. There is no filter
response performance degradation, since the authors use equal functional module to do
the replacement.

This scheme makes watermarking at algorithm level, so it is hard to remove at the lower
levels and there is no degradation o f filter response performance. But this method
increases hardware cost dramatically by +29. It also makes the filter structure to be not
uniform and increases the design time for implementation on ASIC or FPGA.

2.3.3. Windowing Function Watermarking [10] [11]
Suppose W(n) is the original windowing function, where 1<= n <=N.
Firstly the designer adds random noise to W(n) to obtain Wm(n):
Wm(n)=W(n)+a * r(n), 1<=n<=N. Here a is a small number like 0.0001.Then the designer
adds watermarking bits c (n) to Wm (n):
_ W m (n),
Wc (n) =

1<= n <= i-1

Wm (n)+b*c(n-i+l),
Wm (n),
—W c(N+l-n),

i< = n < = i+ P -l
i+P<= n <=N/2

N /2+l<= n <=N.

The designer will let b=0.0001. The starting bit o f the P-bit watermark code sequence
c (n-i+1) is bit i o f Wm (n). The sequence Wc (n), n= l,N , is the new window function
which contains the watermark information.
Watermarking Performance Analysis:
16
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For a classical windowing function with length n, we can embed n bits o f watermark
information, so the embedding efficiency is 1 bit/tap. Since the embedding cost is just to
add random noise sequence as well as watermark bits to the original windowing function,
the embedding procedure is simple and fast at software computational level. The
embedding cost is low. There is no design overhead for this method. Since the watermark
is added to the windowing function after it has been designed.

The authors do not mention the details o f watermark extraction flow. But we can see that
the watermark can be extracted by comparing (subtraction operation) the watermarked
windowing function with the original windowing function. Then by subtracting the
random noise sequence, we can extract the watermark. To do this is simple and fast at
software level. The extraction cost is low. The length o f the watermark decides the
probability o f coincidence. For the watermark with length n, it equals to l/(2An).

The authors do not provide detail information about the application fields. But if this
method is only carried at algorithm level, the attacker may be able to add extra random
noise to the windowing function and remove the watermark. So the security strength is
low. Since this method is developed specifically for windowing function, it can be
applied to windowing function or similar structure functions. The authors do not mention
this method can be applied to other DSP algorithms' ASIC/FPGA implementation or not.

There will be some degree o f performance degradation, which is caused by the
modification o f the windowing function. The degradation is decided by the comparative
ratio o f the windowing function's modification value and the original function value. This
method embeds watermark at algorithm level that is hard to remove at a lower levels. -Its
watermarking scheme is simple and direct. But this method increases design complexity
and the security strength is low.

17
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2.4. FPGA Watermarking Schemes
In this section, two kinds o f FPGA watermarking schemes are described. The first one
uses FPGA spare LUTs to embed watermarking information and the second one is to
manipulate the FPGA bit-stream programming data directly.

2.4.1.FPGA Fingerprinting by Using Spare LUTs (look-up-table)
This method for watermarking FPGA uses the unused lookup table (LUT) bits to encode
the signature bits. In order to further hide the signature, the constrained configurable logic
blocks (CLBs) are incorporated into the design with unused interconnections and
neighboring CLB inputs. Each unused LUT bit can be used to encode one bit o f the mark.
The inputs o f the marked CLB are taken from the passing signals in adjacent routing
channels and outputs are routed to neighboring don’t care inputs. Upon inspection, it is
not apparent which CLB has been marked [5][6][20][21],

Watermarking Performance Analysis:
From the embedding method, every LUT (look-up-table) can be used to embed 16 bits o f
watermark [21], so the embedding efficiency is 16 bit/LUT. When the FPGA device has
two LUTs in one FPGA slice, the embedding efficiency equals to 32 bit/slice. The
embedding cost for this method is not too large. For embedding 7 bits o f watermark, the
hardware usage increase is less than 1%. [5] The author does not mention the timing
delay change before and after watermarking.

To use this method, the designer needs to assign the locations o f the unused LUTs, then
place and route the original design around these watermarked unused LUTs. The authors
o f [5] provide the extraction procedure information. The watermark extractor needs to
find the locations o f the watermarked LUTs and read out the contents o f these LUTs. The
length o f the watermark decides the probability o f coincidence. If the length o f the
embedded watermark is m, the probability o f coincidence is l/(2Am).

The authors o f paper[5] do not give out the analysis o f possible attack methods and the
security strength o f this method. Another paper [8] points out that one attack method
18
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could be used to successfully detect the watermark embedded in this way. Since this
watermarking method uses unused LUTs to embed the watermark, there will be no logic
change connections between these LUTs and the original logic design. So the attacker
may be able to scan the logic changes happening inside the FPGA and separate the
unused LUTs whose output has no effected on the logic changes o f other parts. Since
there is available attach scheme to break this kind o f watermarking, new FPGA
watermarking method need to be developed.

2.4.2. FPGA Programming Bit-stream Data Watermarking [3]
This FPGA watermarking method involves substituting watermark bits for some o f the
bits in the configuration bit stream that control multiplexers for the unused CLB outputs.
This method involves the modification o f the FPGA bit stream programming data. But in
practice, this kind o f knowledge is not open to the FPGA design engineers. So the
application area o f this scheme is limited.

2.5. ASIC Watermarking Schemes
In this section, several ASIC watermarking methods are mentioned. Compared with
FPGA watermarking technology, there are more papers about ASIC watermarking
methods. ASIC watermarking methods at different design stages like logic synthesis, gate
level and layout level have been proposed.

2.5.1. Finger-marking by Transistor Finger W/L (width/length) Watermarking
In paper [3], the author presents a method called finger marking. It can be applied for
integrated circuit design at the physical (layout) design level. The watermark is embedded
in the transistor layout, making this method applicable to digital, analog and mixed-signal
SOC (system-on-chip) designs [3]. The transistors in the circuit design are uniquely
ordered based on their connectivity. The random bit-stream is then embedded into the
transistor geometries to serve as an indelible mark in the circuit. If the value o f the bit
stream bit is 0, the designer then uses even number o f transistor fingers. For example: for
a N-transistor with design specification o f W/L=300um/5um, he uses 2 parallel
19
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150um/5um fingers. If the value o f the bit-stream bit is 1, the designer uses odd number
o f transistor fingers. For example, for a N-transistor with design specification o f
W/L=300um/5um, he uses 3 parallel 100um/5um fingers.

This method can be applied to analog circuit design and easy to be understood by the
designer. But this watermarking scheme increases the design effort to implement the
layout. It is easy to be removed by layout reverse engineering. The reason is that for
analogy design, the layout processing technology is much bigger than pure digital designs.
It makes it easier for the attacker to observe the layout by optical devices( micorscope, for
example). We can extract the circuit diagram from the layout then re-arrange the finger
configurations to remove the watermarking information. But this kind o f reverse
engineering need at nearly the same time to re-design the layout. So this method still has
its value.

2.5.2, Hierarchical Watermarking
Charbon [13][14][15] presents a hierarchical watermarking technique for ASIC designs.
It involves the unique mapping o f design topological information onto a sequence o f
symbols called a topological signature. His method has limited applicability in designs
that use more than just standard cells and lacks robustness analysis[4][12]. Charbon and
Torunoglu also present the watermarking technology o f sequential functions [22]. This
method will impose a digital watermark on the state transition graph o f the synchronous
circuits [22][23].

2.5.3. Protocols for IP Protection
Protocols for IP protection have also been developed for hiding data at the combinational
logic's behavioral synthesis level [16]. This approach involves embedding a watermark as
a set o f design constrains. The synthesis tool results in solution satisfying both the
original design specifications and the additional set o f constrains. Constraint-based
techniques have been proposed for watermarking at different stages o f the VLSI (very
large scale integration) design process. This method can be used well for pure-digital
layouts, but need to be complemented with another scheme when applied for SOC (for
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example, digital-analog-mixed-signal) design. Watermarking protocols added at ASIC
layout place and route stage has also been developed [7].

2.6. Attack Methods Targeting IP Protection Routines
with Watermarking
Several attack methods have been mentioned by different authors [8][17].
An attack method called logic redundancy detection uses logic scan method to scans the
logic transitions happening inside the ASIC or FPGA and try to find the redundancy in
the design. Then the attacker may be able to locate and remove the redundant logics and
the watermark that is implemented by using these redundant logics [8]. Another attack
method is finite state machine reduction. This method is trying to reduce the unused
transitions in the state machine transitions that have been used to embed watermark [17].

The hardware remove method will physically remove the FPGA and ASIC chip that
contains watermark. No existing watermarking scheme can avoid this kind o f attack. But
this method also makes the attacker away from the usage o f the IP. So the copyright
protection purpose also has been realized [17].

Other attack methods include encryption system attacks. This one is the attack o f the DES
and AES cryptographic algorithms. This method is a big challenge o f the security o f
many watermarking schemes. The designer needs to keep an eye on the most advanced
technology o f encryption. And the attack for ASIC logic synthesis level watermarking
tries to extract the logic synthesis constrains that contain watermark information. ASIC
layout level reverse engineering is to recover the original circuit design by photographing
the layout, then carry human or computer vision detection for layout to logic extraction.

2.7. Importance of Developing New Watermarking
Schemes for DSP Algorithms’ FPGA Implementation
The author selects the DSP algorithm's FPGA implementation's watermarking as the topic
21
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o f the thesis. The reason is the DSP algorithm's FPGA implementations are widely used
for the consumer electronics as well as telecommunication applications. And the
protection o f this kind of IPs is important. To show the importance o f the FPGA
watermarking technology, two real scenarios are used to show its application for FPGA
based IPs' fingerprinting and watermarking.

Scenario One: Who Have Sold the FPGA Chips to Our Enemy?
Figure 7 Who Have Sold the FPGAs to Our Enemy?
Country A

FPGA IP Producer X

AeentMl

fAgent .‘‘2

i t -jwaa
FPGA ImportAgeii

I
Radar RAD Institut

Country B

Air-force Radar Base
In this scenario, FPGA IP producer X in country A produces FPGA chips and develops
high performance DSP IP soft cores. This company also sells FGPAs with DSP IP cores
implemented inside. Company X sells their products through 99 retail agents. The
customer officers o f country A find some mail packages that contained company X's
FPGA products. These mail packages are mailed to the electronics retail agent M in
country B. But the names and addresses o f the sender are false. FBI officers do not find
any valuable human being's fingerprints o f the sender, except those fingerprints o f the
post officers'. So the question here is: How the FBI officer can identify which sales agent
has involved into the illegal export o f the FPGAs? Is there any technology that can make
this task much easier?

FPGA watermarking technology is one o f the good candidates that can be used to
fingerprint the FPGAs. For this kind o f applications, the watermark is used as fingerprints
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to identify different objects. For our example, there are 99 retail agents and we need at
lest 99 different fingerprints to identify all the sales agents. So we need 8-bit watermark
length, since 2's power 8 is 128. The idea is each sales agent will receive different
watermarks that have been embedded into the FPGAs containing DSP IP cores. Although
the functions o f these FPGAs are the exactly the same, the watermark is different. And all
the watermarks have been documented by company X. In this way, the FBI officer will
feel easy to trace the source o f the illegal exported FPGAs, by contacting company X and
extracting the watermark inside the FPGAs. In chapter 4, the author's implementation
results o f such kind o f 8-bit watermark into some real world DSP IPs are presented. The
simulations are used to verify the effect o f watermark embedding. The simulation results
are encouraging.

Scenario Two: Is Mr. Z the DSP IP Thief?
Mr. Z is the technician who works for company X that produces FPGAs and DSP IP
cores. Mr. Z's job is to program the FPGA chips with the programming data that is stored
in the PC. Mr. Z has ability to read and copy the data. Some sales persons o f company X
report that another company, company Y, also sales the similar products. So the managers
o f company X want to know weather Mr. Z has sold the FPGA programming data to
company Y. If it is true, how can company X suite Mr. Z, as well as company Y in the
court? What kind o f evidence will help company X to win the case? Insiders make many
high-tech IP stealing cases; the law procedures for these cases are normally long and
complicated, partly due to the high-tech background. This makes the suite process time
and money consuming.

So is there any technology that will simplify the situation and help to protect the right- o f
the original IP copyright owner? As mentioned in chapter one, watermarking technology
can also be used for copyright information embedding. The watermark length o f this kind
o f application will sometime be longer than the watermark's length for fingerprinting
usages. For this case, we need 128-bit watermark, to provide strong enough witness for
copyright provident. In chapter 4, the simulation results o f embedding this kind o f 128-bit
watermark are presented.
23
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From the review o f the current available DSP algorithms' and FPGA implementation
watermarking schemes, the area o f watermarking for DSP algorithms is relatively new.
Although some people have done a lot o f innovative work in this area, the proposals they
have mentioned still have space for improvement, and the application fields o f those
watermarking schemes need to be extended. DSP algorithms' FPGA implementation is
today's hot-point in the consumer electronics market. FPGAs can provide hardware based
fully parallel data processing ability, which makes the FPGAs good candidates for ultrahigh speed and high volume throughout DSP applications, like wireless applications,
wide band network, etc.

The filter magnitude modification scheme will introduce 7% hardware increase. The filter
taps' equal replacement also have 29% hardware increase after watermarking. And the
windowing function' watermarking scheme may be broken by adding false watermark at
algorithm level. The current available FPGA watermarking methods also have some
limitations. The look-up-table (LUT) watermarking scheme has been broken and the
FPGA bit stream modification scheme is not fit for those engineers who do not have
knowledge o f the format o f FPGA bit-stream data. The FPGA producers also announce
that they will not expose such bit-stream format information to the public, for confidential
reason and EP protection considerations. So to develop new and better watermarking
schemes that can protect DSP algorithms' FPGA implementation becomes important.

In chapter 3, the FIR filter coefficients' modification watermarking scheme will be
presented. The idea to modify the original image bitmap data and windowing function
coefficients has been proposed by several papers [1][10][11]. The author o f this thesis
extends the application area o f this idea to filter and other DSP algorithms. By embedding
the coefficients into ASIC and FPGA hardware level, the security strength o f
watermarking scheme has been increased. In chapter 4, the watermarking through FPGA
cell locations' constrain is introduced. This is an innovative watermarking scheme that
works at FPGA layout level. This scheme uses the unique layout structure o f FPGA to
embed watermark information into the FPGA cells' layout coordinates.
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Chapter 3: FIR Filter Coefficient
Modification Watermarking
3.1. Watermarking Scheme
For the filter coefficients' LSB watermarking scheme, a designer who is responsible for
the watermark embedding firstly needs to have the filter's coefficients' file. The designer
will use the watermark bits to replace the filter coefficients' LSBs. After embedding o f the
watermark, the designer needs to run simulation o f the filter with the watermarked
coefficients. If the simulation results are acceptable, the designer will save the filter's
coefficients to a new file and the watermarking flow ends here. For the watermark
extraction, the designer needs to read out the filter's coefficients, find the watermark
locations and extract their LSBs. After that, he can obtain the watermark bit sequence.
Let a FIR filter design be given by:
Y(k)=A0*x(k)+A 1*x(k-1)+....... + A n-l*x(k-N -l), where k = 0 ,l,........ ,N-1.
Here AO, A l,

, An-1 are filter coefficients. A watermark, for instance, is 10001010.

Watermark embedding process is to replace the filter coefficients’ LSBs with the
watermark bits. Table 1 shows the procedure o f watermark embedding by replacing filer
coefficients' LSBs.
Table 1 FIR Filter Coefficients' LSB W atermarking Scheme
Original Filter Coefficients

Modified Filter Coefficients

Watermark bits

A0: 1111-1111-1100-0100

A0: 1111-1111-1100-0101

1

A l: 1111-1111-0100-1101

A l: 1111-1111-0100-1100

0

A2: 1111-1111-1010-1001

A2: 1111-1111-1010-1000

0

A3: 0000-0000-1110-1010

A3: 0000-0000-1110-1010

0

A4: 0000-0011-0111-1000

A4: 0000-0011-0111-1001

1

A5: 0000-1000-1101-1111

A5: 0000-1000-1101-1110

0

A6: 0000-0001-1111-1010

A6: 0000-0001-1111-1011

1

A7: 1111-1110-0101-0110

A7: 1111-1110-0101-0110

0
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The watermark embedding flow o f filter coefficient modification is concluded in the
following paragraph:
Schemel.arW atermark Embedding by Filter Coefficients' Modification
Input: Filter design specifications, watermark bits that need to be embedded
Output: Watermarked filter design
Step 1.Design filter by using filter design specifications.
Step 2:Obtain digitized filter coefficients with specific word length.
Step 3:Modify filter's coefficients' LSBs according to watermark bits
Step 4:Use the modified filter coefficients as the simulation inputs o f the filter design tool.
Verify weather the filter's response satisfies the design specification or not.
4.1.If yes, output the watermarked filter's coefficients, stop the procedure.
4.2.If no, check weather we can increase the filter's coefficients or not.
4.2.1.If yes, go to Step 2.
4.2.2.If no, stop the procedure.

The watermark extraction procedure is as following: The watermark extractor first reads
out the filter's coefficients and get the LSBs of the coefficients. The binary sequence of
the filter coefficients' LSBs is the watermark information. For the improvement o f the
watermark scheme's security, the filter's coefficients need to be solidified into FPGA
hardware by using ROM (read only memory) programming or hard-wiring (connect the
signal lines with power or ground). So the designer needs to either read out the filter's
coefficients from the ROM or find the internal hard-wired signals' value that are used as
filter's coefficients. The following scheme shows the watermark extraction procedures.
Schem el.b: Watermark Extraction for Filter Coefficients' Modification
Input: Filter coefficients (binary format), watermark bits that need to be verified
Output: Embedded watermark/copyright confidence
Step 1. Extract the filter coefficients LSBs.
Step 2:Read out the LSBs within the specific range where the watermark supposed to be
added.
Step 3:Compare the LSBs read from the filter coefficients with the original watermark
bits, check how many bits match and get their match rate.
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3.2. Simulation of Coefficients’ LSB Watermarking
To evaluate the effectiveness o f proposal one, FIR filter LSBs’ watermarking, the author
makes the simulation to check the filter performance degradation after watermarking.
Commercial filter design and simulation tool is used to carry the simulation. Here are the
filter's original design specifications:
Direct form II transposed equal ripple low pass FIR filter
Order: 8
Fs:

48 KHz

Fpass: 9.6 KHz
Fstop: 12 KHz
Wpass: 1 dB
Wstop: 20 dB

The Matlab FDA (Filter Design and Analysis) tool is used to design the original filter and
create the filter magnitude response before and after the watermarking. By reading out the
magnitude response after watermarking, the difference o f Wpass and Wstop o f the filter
before and after watermarking are less than 0.1 dB.

Figure 8 FIR Filter’s Magnitude Response Before (Left) and After Watermarking
(Right), 16-bit Coefficients
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From the simulation results, we can see that FIR filter coefficients’ LSB watermarking
method will introduce some degree o f performance degradation. The author also carries
the simulation for the watermarking o f the same FIR filter with 8-bit coefficients. But the
simulation results show that the magnitude distortion is too large and unacceptable. So for
8-bit coefficients case, the LSB watermarking scheme introduces too large magnitude
response change. 16-bit watermarking case works well, with quite small magnitude
response degradation. Coefficients’ LSB watermarking method can also be extended to
other DSP algorithms that have a sequence o f parameters.

3.3.Watermarking Performance Analysis
To evaluate the watermarking scheme's performance for proposal one, the author uses the
evaluation items that have been introduced in chapter 2. The evaluation results will also
be used for the summarizations that are made at the end o f this chapter.

Embedding Efficiency: 1 bit/tap. From the watermarking method, we can embed one bit
o f information with each filter coefficient. The maxim number o f watermarking bits that
can be embedded to the filter's coefficients is equal to the number o f the filter's taps.
Embedding Cost: The embedding procedure is simple and direct. The designer can
modify the filter's coefficients' LSBs by using normal text editors, like notepad or so.
There is no hardware or timing punishment for this method.
Design Overhead: There is no design overhead for the filter design itself. The watermark
is added after the filter design has been finished. But the designer who embeds the
watermark needs to run simulation after watermarking to verify the filter's performance
degradation is acceptable or not.
Extraction Cost: The extraction procedure is direct and simple. People just need to read
out the filter's coefficients' LSBs and get the watermark bit sequence.
Probability o f Coincidence (Pu):If we use all available coefficients' LSB

for

watermarking, the probability o f coincidence equals to l/(2An)), where n is the number o f
filter taps. For the 8-bit watermark and 8-tap filter case, this number equals to 1/256. For
128-bit watermark, this number equals to 3.4E-38.
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Security Strength: For those DSP algorithms whose coefficients have been programmed
into non-erasable memory (ROM) or implemented through hard wiring, this method
provides very strong security strength. The attacker will have no way to remove the
watermark embedded inside the coefficients' LSBs unless he removes the ASIC or FPGA
chip.
Applied Area: This method can be applied to filter algorithms, as well as DSP algorithms'
ASIC/FPGA implementation that have sequential parameters. The filter coefficients or
other parameters should be solidified into the hardware.
Filter Performance Degradation: The filter performance degradation is decided by the
filter coefficients' word-length. For 16-bit FIR filter case, the magnitude degradation is
less than O.ldB.
Probability o f Detection Miss (Pm): From the watermark detection procedure, we can see
that the probability o f a detection miss is O.The extractor can always successfully extract
the watermark information by reading out the filter's coefficients' LSBs.
Table 2 Comparisons between Filter Coefficient Modification Watermarking and
Current Filter Watermarking Schemes

Filter

Magnitude

Tap's

Equal

Modification

Replacement

Windowing

Filter

Function

Modification

Watermarking

Watermarking

Medium

Small

Small

Small

+7%

+29%

N/A

0%

High

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Medium

Low

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Medium

Low

High

Performance
Degradation
Hardware
Usage Increase
Design
Overhead
Extraction
Cost
Probability of Low
Coincidence
Security

Medium
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Coefficient

The proposed filter coefficient's modification watermarking scheme shows better
performance than other current available filter watermarking schemes with most
performance items. The filter's hardware usage increase is 0% and is the major strong
point for this new proposal. The design overhead is also low due to little additional design
effort required for watermark embedding. The probability o f coincidence is low due to the
large amount o f watermark information that can be embedded inside the filter's
coefficients. The security strength is quite high because o f the hardware solidation o f the
watermark information, so to remove the watermark is physically impossible. All in all,
the proposed filter coefficients' modification watermarking scheme shows good
watermarking performance and has good potential for practical DSP algorithms'
watermarking.
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Chapter 4: Watermarking Through
FPGA Cell Location Constrain
The FPGA cell location constrain watermarking scheme uses the FPGA cells' x and y
coordinates to embed the watermark information. This method belongs to the physical
constrain watermarking method. By doing so, each selected FPGA layout cell for
watermarking can embed 2 bits o f information. Several real world IPs like FIR filter,
CDMA match filter, discrete cosine transform (DCT) are used to embed 8-bit watermark.
The simulation results are used to verify the watermarking performance. Varied length
watermark embedding are carried for the FIR filter to study the relationship between
design overhead and watermark length.

4.1.Watermarking Scheme
The watermarking flow for this scheme is firstly set up some kind o f watermark
embedding rules. Then the designer needs to select the FPGA layout cells that will be
used for watermarking. After that, the designer makes the original implementation o f the
IP without watermarking. After this step, the selected FPGA cells will be moved
according to the watermarking rules. And the FPGA implementation procedure will be
carried again with these new layout location constrains. The finished layout o f the FPGA
will contain the watermark information that the designer has embedded by constraining
the cells' layout locations.

Let a FIR filter design be given by:
Y(k)=A0*X(k)+A 1*X(k-1)+.......+A n-1*X(k-N-1),where k = 0 ,l,....N -l.
Suppose we need to embed a watermark consists o f 8 bits as 10001010. Let the RAM
(random access memory) cells to store Ai be RAM_i, i=0,l,...,7. A RAM cell in FPGA
layout can be identified by its coordinates (x, y). The watermark embedding rules are
described as following:
31
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If the bits are 00, we choose both x and y as even.
If the bits are 01, we choose x as even and y as odd.
If the bits are 10, we choose x as odd and y as even.
If the bits are 11, we choose both x and y as odd.
Table 3 shows the procedure o f embedding watermark to RAM cells' location coordinates.
Table 3 FPGA Cell Location Watermarking
Watermarking Bits

RAM_i for Storing Ai

New Location o f the
Chosen RAM Cell: (x, y)

RAM_0

1

(1,4)

0
RAM_1

0

(4,4)

0
RAM_2

1

(3,2)

0
RAM_3

1

(3,0)

0

Figure 9 FPGA Layout with 48*16 Slices Array
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For FPGA devices, the whole layout is divided into certain number o f slices, (see figure 9)
There are route path between slices. Each slice has some kind o f logic resources, like 16bit RAMs, look-up tables, D-type flip-flops and so on. Different types o f FPGA devices
will have different number o f slices available, as well as the logic cells' type and amount
within each slice. For watermarking purpose, we can use the logic cells like 16-bit RAM,
D-type flip-flop or other kind o f logic cells to embed the watermark information. The
selection o f the cells should satisfy that each cell used for watermarking does not occupy
more than one FPGA slice.

Scheme 2.a.Watermark Embedding Flow of FPGA Cell Location Modification
Input: Original FPGA logic and layout design and design specifications, watermark bits
need to be embedded
Output: Watermarked FPGA layout design
Step l.Try to find FPGA layout RAM cells that have sequential relations from the logic
view.
1.1.If we can find, from these RAM layout cells,
1.1.1 .Try to find layout cells that occupy less than 1/4 FPGA slices. If we can
find them, go to step 2.
1.1.2.Try to find layout cells that occupy less than or equal 1 FPGA slices.
If we can find them, go to step 2.
If we cannot, stop the procedure.
1.2.If we cannot, stop the procedure.
Step 2.Select layout cells locating at loose place and route area.
2.1 .From the cells we find in step 1,try to find those cells locating at unused
place and route areas.
2.1.1.If we can find them, go to step 3.
2.1.2.If we cannot, go to step 2.2.
2.2.From the cells we find in step l,try to find those cells locating at loose
place and route areas.
2.2.1. If we can find them, go to step 3.
2.2.2.If we cannot, use the cells we find in step 1 and go to step 3.
33
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Step 3.From the layout cells we find in step 2, select layout cells locating at parallel logic
paths.
3.1 .If we can find them, go to step 4.
3.2.If we cannot, use the cells we find in step 2 and go to step 4.
Step 4.From the layout cells we find in step 3, select layout cells locating at non-critical
logic paths.
4.1.If we can find them, go to step 5.
4.2.If we cannot, use the layout cells we find in step 3 and go to step 5.
Step 5.For every selected watermarking cell, try to find new location for re-locating that
satisfies watermarking bit and watermarking rules.
5.1 .Try to find spare layout slice within one slice distance.
5.1.1.If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
5.1.2.If we cannot, try to find spare layout slice within two slices distance.
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.

5.1 .n.If we cannot, try to find spare layout slice within n slices distance. Here
n is the largest slice number o f possible movement.
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
5.2.If we cannot find it, try to swap this layout cell with another layout cell that is
not selected as watermarking cell and within one slice location.
5.2.1 .If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
5.2.2.If we cannot, try to find such layout cell within two slices distance.
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.

5.2.n.If we cannot, try to find spare layout slice within n slices distance. Here
n is the largest slice number o f possible swap .
If we can find it, move the layout cell to the new location. Go to step 6.
If we cannot, stop the procedure.
Step 6.Run place and route with the watermarked layout cell locations.
Step 7.Read out the place and route report after watermarking. Verify weather the
watermarked layout implementation satisfies the design specification or not.
34
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7.1.If yes, output the layout and create the bit-streaming data, stop the procedure.
7.2.If no, check weather all possible layout cell candidates for watermarking have
been tried or not.
7.2.1.If yes, stop the procedure.
7.2.2.If no, go to step 1 and find new watermarking candidates.

The above paragraph shows the watermarking flow o f FPGA RAM cell locations'
watermarking schemes. This watermarking flow can also be applied to DSP algorithms'
watermarking. The requirement is that the DSP algorithm has some kind o f sequence of
parameters that can be implemented with hardware. If the DSP algorithm does not have
such kind o f sequential parameters, only the FPGA cell location modification proposal
can be applied.
Here the FIR filter's coefficients' LSB watermarking and the RAM cell locations'
watermarking are used as examples. The proposal o f FIR filter coefficient modification
watermarking also can be extended to any DSP algorithms that have sequential structure
o f parameters and the parameters can be solidified into the FPGA hardware (For example,
the filter's coefficients are programmed into the ROMs within FPGA chips. Another way
to solidify the parameters with hardware is hard wiring. For example, when the filter's
coefficients' bit is 0, this bit-line will be connected with ground. When the filter's
coefficients' bit is 1, this bit-line will be connected with pow er.) The second proposal can
be extended to any pure digital logic IP's FPGA implementation as long as these digital
IPs have some kind o f sequential structure o f layout cells. The DES/AES encryption
function is provided by the FPGA implementation tool [16].

Scheme 2.b.FIR Filter FPGA Cell Location Watermark Extraction Flow
Input: Watermarked FPGA layout design, original watermark bits that have be embedded
Output: Watermark embedded within FPGA layout design
Step l.Find the layout locations o f RAM cells storing FIR filter coefficients
Step 2. Extract RAM cells' (x, y) location labels.
Step 3. Using cell location watermarking rules to extract the embedded watermark.
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Step 4. Compare the embedded watermark with the original watermark, get copyright
confidence measure.

The above scheme shows the watermark extraction flow. Here the FIR filter's coefficients'
LSB watermarking and FPGA RAM cell location watermarking schemes have been used
to embed the watermarks inside the FIR filter's coefficients and RAM cell locations'
coordinates. The extractor needs to extract the watermarks inside the FPGA layout as well
as FIR filter's coefficients. The extractor will be given the complete original logic design
files containing all the schematics and placement/route files. The watermark extractor will
also be given the FPGA design and debug software that are used to design and implement
the original FIR filter design.

During the watermark extraction flow, the extractor firstly needs to find the layout
locations o f the RAM cells that store FIR filter's coefficients. The extractor can use the
original logic and layout design files to search these RAM cells between logic schematic
and layout. Then he will be able to extract the RAM cells' x and y coordinates. After that
the extractor can use the RAM cells' x and y coordinates to get the embedded watermark
information, by referencing the watermark embedding rules. After that he also can read
out the RAM cell's contents by applying correct address and read signals to the FPGA
chip and get the FIR filter's coefficients. After reading out the coefficients' LSBs, he gets
the watermark that has been embedded into the FIR filter's coefficients LSBs.

4.2.FPGA Cell's Location Watermarking Simulation
Procedures and Results
This section describes the simulation results for embedding 8-bit watermark to different
FPGA devices as well as embedding different length watermark (from 8-bit to 128-bit)
into the FIR filter design. The watermarking procedures are described step by step. To
compare with the results from paper [21], the author o f this thesis also selects the Xilinx
FPGA device and its implementation tools.
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4.2.1. Embedding 8-bit Watermark: Virtex-II device
The FIR filter has the following specifications:
Single rate single channel FIR filter
Number o f taps: 8
Coefficient width: 16-bit
Coefficient data type: signed
Coefficients reload ability: yes
Input data width: 16-bit, signed
Output data width: 32-bit, signed
Implementation type: fully serial, conventional structure

The FPGA implementation software tool environments are:
Design and Implementation tool: Xilinx ISE (integrated silicon environment) 4.2
Design Flow: VHDL
Synthesis tool: XST VHDL
Floor plan tool: Xilinx Floor Planer
Place and route optimization goal: timing
Target FPGA device: Xilinx Virtex-II, XCV250, speed grade -6
Simulation Procedures:
Stepl: Input the FIR filter design into the ISE design tool.
Figure 10 FIR Filter's Schematic Diagram
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Step 2:Synthesis the FIR filter using XST VHDL
Step 3:Place and route the FIR filter without location constrains. After this step, we will
get the FPGA place and route result with timing optimization.
Step 4:Suppose the registers that store filter's coefficient AO’s 4 LSBs are register 0-3,
respectively. In this case, the registers will be used to embed the watermark. The registers
are used to implement the function o f RAM cells. We will re-assign these 4 registers with
following new slice locations:
RegisterO: Slice (13,26)------->(13,26)
R egisterl: Slice (13,26)------->(12,22)
Register2: Slice (5, 23)-------->(5,20)
Register3: Slice (5, 23)-------- > (5,20)
Step 5:Run placement and route again with watermark location constrains, get the new
layout with watermark inside. In this case, we only move the cells that we need to use for
watermarking and do not change the locations of those cells that have not been used for
watermarking.

Figure 11 Original Layout of the FIR Filter, Virtex-II Device
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Figure 12 Watermarked Layout of the FIR Filter, 8-bit Watermark, Virtex-II
Device
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From the layouts o f the FIR filter before and after watermarking, it is quite hard to find
the locations o f the watermark by only observing the watermarked layout. This is the
property o f the transparency o f the watermark. This property makes it more difficult to
detect and remove the watermark from the FPGA layout by potential attackers. (Here we
suppose the potential attacker does not have access to the original layout of the FIR filter.
Because by comparing the original and after watermarking layouts, the difference can be
easily identified. If the attacker already has access to the original layout, it is not
necessary for him to attack the watermark anym ore.)

The selection o f cells' new locations is decided by the author with referencing the original
optimization layout location placement results to make as small distance change as
possible. This will help to achieve better timing performance. After implementing both
the design, the author gets the timing reports, (see appendix A and B), to find the detailed
timing delay information. The author also gets the place and route reports (see appendix
C and appendix D) that show the hardware usage information before and after
watermarking.
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The following table shows the results o f the two implementations on Virtex II device,
before watermarking and after watermarking, with 8-bit watermark embedding.
Table 4 FIR Filter Cell Location Watermarking, 8-bit, Virtex-II Device
Maxim

net

Minim Period

delay

Max

Hardware

Frequency

(slices)

Before watermarking

4.441 ns

9.289 ns

107.654 MHz

488/1536

After watermarking

4.441 ns

9.392 ns

106.474 MHz

489/1536

So after watermarking, the FIR filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(9.392-9.289)/9.289 = + 1.109 %
Hardware cost increase by :(489-488)/488

= + 0.205 %

The movement o f the registers introduces the timing delay increase from their timing
optimization results. And the hardware cost increase is caused by the movement o f
registers to spare slices. Before watermarking, these registers share slices with other logic
cells. When certain register is moved to a spare slice and cannot share with other logic
cells that are not used for watermarking, the hardware cost will increase by one FPGA
slice. If we can find such slice that can satisfy the watermarking rule and is shared by the
logic cells that will not be used for watermarking, the hardware cost will not change.

4.2.2. FIR Filter Cell Location W atermarking, 8-bit watermark, Virtex II Pro device
Table 5 FIR Filter Cell Location W atermarking, 8-bit, Virtex II PRO Device
Maxim

net Minim Period

Hardware

Max Frequency

delay

cost
(slices)

Before

3.210ns

5.593ns

178.795MHz

488/1536

2.947ns

5.540ns

180.505MHz

490/1536

watermarking
After
watermarking
So after watermarking, the FIR filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(5.540-5.593)/5.593 = - 0.948 %
Hardware cost increases by (490-488)7488

= + 0.410 %
40

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

cost

4.2.3. FIR Filter Watermarking, Watermark Length Varying from 8 bits to 128 bits,
Virtex II Device
To study the relationships o f the length o f the watermark and the FPGA implementation
results, several implementations o f the watermark whose length varies from 8 bits to 128
bits are carried. Firstly the author uses Matlab to create 128 bits o f random number
sequence. Then the author uses the FIR filter's registers that store the coefficients to
embed the watermark, using watermark embedding rules. The registers are selected and
used from the register that store FIR filter's coefficient AO, then the register that store FIR
filter's coefficient A l, so on and so forth.

Table 6 FIR Filter Cell Location Watermarking, 8-bit to 128-bit, Virtex II Device

Watermark

Max net delay

Min Period

Max Frequency

length

(ns)

(ns)

(MHz)

0

4.441

9.289

107.654

488

8 bits

4.934

13.866

72.119

489

16 bits

4.941

13.866

72.119

488

32 bits

4.934

13.866

72.119

495

64 bits

4.941

13.866

72.119

498

128 bits

5.504

13.866

72.119

510

Hardware cost (slice)
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The following figure shows the relationship between watermark length and maxim net
delay:
Figure 13 FIR Filter Watermark Length & Max Net Delay Relation
Max Net D elay (ns)
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From Figure 16 we can see that when the watermark length changes from 8 bits to 64 bits,
the max net delay keeps nearly the same. As the author explains later in this chapter, the
increase o f the timing delay that happens at different logic path will not accumulate all
together according to simple addition operation relation. As long as the timing increase
happening within watermarked logic paths is smaller than the max net delay path's timing
delay, the max net delay for the FPGA will not change. If the later on watermark cells'
movement introduces net delay increase that overpasses the original max net delay, the
final max net delay for the FPGA chip will increase further.
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The following figure shows the relation between watermark length and Maxim frequency:
Figure 14 FIR Filter Embedding W atermark Length and Max Frequency
Relation
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From figure 14, we can see that the max frequency does not change when the embedding
watermark length changes from 8-bit to 128-bit. The max frequency is decided by the
minim period o f the FPGA chip.
Figure 15 FIR Filter Embedding W atermark Length and Hardware Usage Relation
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From figure 15, the after all tendency is that the hardware usage o f the FPGA after
watermarking increases when the watermark length increases. When we need to embed
longer watermark, we need more spare FPGA slices to re-assign the watermarking FPGA
cells. If we cannot find the slices that we can share the watermarking FPGA cells with
the cells that have not been selected for watermarking usage, the hardware usage will
increase.
Figure 16 FIR Filter Cell Movement Distance Distribution, 128-bit Watermark
25 F P G A Slice N u m b e r (slice)

_________

F P G A Slice M o v e m e n t D is ta n c e From Original Location

(slice)

The cell movement distance used here means the difference between the cell's original x
coordinate and the cell's x coordinate after watermarking, or the difference between the
cell's original y coordinate and the cell's y coordinate after watermarking, whatever is the
larger. To embed 128-bit watermark information, we need 64 FPGA cells for location
watermarking usage. From Figure 19, we can see that 70%(45 cells out o f 64 cells) o f the
cell movements happen within one slice distance. And the longest movement is 11 slices.

4.2.4. FIR Filter Watermarking, Watermark Length Varying from 8-bit to 128-bit,
Virtex II Device, Reverse Sequence
In this simulation, several implementations o f the watermark whose length varies from 8
bits to 128 bits are also carried. The author uses the FIR filter's registers that store the
coefficients to embed the watermark in reverse sequence. The registers are selected begin
from the registers that store FIR filter's coefficient A15 (Firstly we will use the register
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that stores A15's MSB, then we will use the register that store A15's 15th bit, so on and so
forth.) After we use up the registers that store A15, we will use registers that store FIR
filter's coefficient A14. Finally we will use the registers for storing A12. (For 128 bits
watermark embedding, we need 64 registers all together.)

Table 7 FIR Filter Cell Location Watermarking, 8-bit to 128-bit, Virtex II Device,
Reverse sequence
Watermark

Max

length

net delay

Min Period

Max Frequency

Hardware cost (slice)

(ns)

(ns)

(MHz)

0

4.441

9.289

107.654

488

8 bits

4.864

9.554

104.668

489

16 bits

4.864

9.554

104.668

489

32 bits

4.859

9.554

104.668

492

64 bits

4.859

9.554

104.668

494

128 bits

4.859

9.554

104.668

503

Figure 17 FIR Filter Watermark Length & Max Net Delay Relation, Reverse
Sequence
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From Figure 17 we can see that when the watermarking length changes from 8-bit to 128bit, the max net delay keeps nearly the same.
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Figure 18 FIR Filter Embedding Watermark Length and Max Frequency Relation,
Reverse Sequence
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From figure 18, we can see that the max frequency does not change when the embedding
watermark length changes from 8-bit to 128-bit. The max frequency is decided by the
minim period o f the FPGA chip.

Figure 19 FIR Filter Embedding Watermark Length and Hardware Usage Relation,
Reverse Sequence
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From figure 19, the tendency is that the hardware usage o f the FPGA after watermarking
increases when the watermark length increases. Comparing with figure 18, we can see
that for embedding same length watermark, the reverse embedding method cause less
hardware usage increase.

Figure 20 FIR Filter Cell Movement Distance Distribution, 128-bit Watermark,
Reverse sequence
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4.3.Watermarking Simulations for Other FPGA IPs
To evaluate the performance o f the FPGA cell locations' watermarking scheme, the
author also makes several simulations for other types o f DSP algorithms' watermarking.
These DSP algorithms include comb filter, CDMA match filter, DCT and waveform
synthesizer. These DSP algorithms are among the most widely used DSP IP cores.
Another non-DSP IP is also used to verify the applicability o f this proposal for general
form digital IP's FPGA implementation's watermarking.

4.3.1. Comb Filter Watermarking, 8-bit watermark
Comb filters are widely used in image processing and signal up-sampling/down-sampling.
Here are the comb filter IP's specifications:
Comb filter type: Interpolator
Input bus width: 16-bit
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Number o f stages: 4
Sample rate change: 16000
Differential delay: 2
The following is the comb filter watermarking results with 8-bit watermark.

Table 8 Comb Filter Watermarking, 8-bit watermark
Min

Max frequency

Period
Before

Max

combinational

Max net

Hardware

path delay

delay

cost (slice)

7.568ns

132.135MHz

7.911ns

3.918ns

501/1536

7.538ns

132.661MHz

8.526ns

4.087ns

504/1536

watermarking
After
watermarking
So after watermarking, the comb filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(7.538-7.568)/7.568 = -0 .3 9 6 %
Hardware cost increases by (504-501)7501

= + 0.599 %

4.3.2.CDMA Match Filter Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
The CDMA match filter is also watermarked with 8-bit watermark.
The following table shows the implementation results before and after watermarking:
Here the mem-16s cells (16-bit memory blocks) are used for watermarking.

Table 9 CDMA Match Filter Watermarking, 8-bit watermark
Min

Max frequency

Period
Before

Max

combinational

Max net

Hardware

path delay

delay

cost (slice)

14.113ns

70.857MHz

N/A

9.329ns

2T33/3072

13.870ns

72.098MHz

N/A

8.868ns

2133/3072

watermarking
After
watermarking
So after watermarking, the C DMA match filter’s
Timing delay increases by :(13.870-14.113)/14.113 = - 1.722 %
Hardware cost increase by: (2133-2133)/2132

=+0

%
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After watermarking, the FPGA's max frequency has been improved by 1.722% and the
hardware usage does not change. The hardware usage does not change since the original
mem-16 cells do not share slice with any other logic components. So the movements o f
these m em -16 cells do not increase the hardware usage.

4.3.3.DCT Watermarking, 8-bit W atermark
The DCT IP is widely used for image processing. Here we use the 1-D DCT IP for
watermarking.
This DCT IP has the following specifications:
Operation mode: Forward DCT (1-D)
Number o f points: 16 enable symmetry
Performance: 9-clock cycles/sample
Coefficients width: 8-bit
Input data width: 8-bit, signed
Precision control: Round
Result width: 20

Table 10 DCT Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
Min

Max frequency

Period
Before

Max net

Hardware

path delay

delay

cost (slice)

Max

combinational

7.068ns

141.483MHz

7.960ns

4.970ns

1173/1536

7.804ns

128.139MHz

8.469ns

4.775ns

1173/1536

watermarking
After
watermarking
So after watermarking, the DCT's
Timing delay increases by :(7.804-7.068)/7.068 = +10.4 %
Hardware cost increase by: (1173-1173)/1173

=+0%

4.3.4. Direct Waveform Synthesizer Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
The direct digital synthesizer can produce sine and cosine waveforms, without using
look-up tables. It uses the iteration operations to create the sine and cosine waveforms.
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Its design specification are shown below:
Output width: 16-bit
Function :Output both sine and cosine waveforms
M emory type: Distributed ROM
Pipelined operation: Yes
Phase increment: Register based
Data width: 16-bit
Phase angle width: 4-bit
Phase offset: None
Noise shaping: No
In this case, the author uses the 16-bit distributed ROMs to embed the watermark
information.
Table 11 Direct Waveform Synthesizer Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
Min

Max frequency

Period
Before

Max net

Hardware

path delay

delay

cost (slice)

Max

combinational

4.3000ns

232.558MHz

6.919ns

3.864ns

34/1536

4.261ns

234.687MHz

6.919ns

4.404ns

37/1536

watermarking
After
watermarking
So after watermarking, the direct waveform synthesizer's
Timing delay increases by :(4.261-4.300)/4.300 = + 0.907 %
Hardware cost increase by (37-34)/34

= + 8.82 %

4.3.5. Board Interface Circuit Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
From the discussion and simulation procedure, the FPGA cell location's watermarking
method can also be used for other types o f IPs that have sequential logic structures.(For
example, the IP we need to watermark has 8 registers in serial.)The watermarking
simulation for non-DSP IP is also carried. The IP here is the interface circuit between the
FPGA chip and personal computer, for test and debug purpose. The implementation
results are shown as below:(Four D-type flip-flops are used to carry the 8-bit watermark
information)
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Table 12 Board Interface Circuit Watermarking, 8-bit Watermark
Min

Max frequency

Period
Before

Max net

Hardware

path delay

delay

cost (slice)

Max

combinational

10.410ns

96.061MHz

13.484ns

2.602ns

192/256

10.548ns

94.805MHz

13.948ns

2.602ns

192/256

watermarking
After
watermarking
So after watermarking,
Timing delay increases by :(10.548-10.410)/10.410 = +1.326 %
Hardware cost increase by (192-192)/ 192

= +0 %

There is 1.326% maxim working frequency decrease and the hardware usage does not
change. The hardware usage does not change since the original D-type flip-flops do not
share FPGA slice with other components. So the movements o f these D-type flip-flops do
not increase the hardware usage.

4.4. Detail Watermarking Steps for Implementation
Optimization
From the simulation, the author concludes that the following watermarking rules might
help the designer to optimize the FPGA's timing performance after watermarking. These
guild-lines give the designer some direction for implementation optimization during the
watermarking procedure.

The designer should try to use the FPGA cells that locate along the border around the
loose placement areas. Some times we will also have placement holes that in this area no
FPGA hardware resource has been used. The designer should try to avoid using the
FPGA cells that locate inside the dense place and route area. (We call these dense place
and route area hot areas, just like the traffic jam areas in modem big cities o f human
being). To make such kind o f selections will give us more selections for the new locations
of watermark cells and may improve implementation results. If we use the cells that are
inside the hot area, we will feel more difficult to find available new locations for
watermarking within small slice movement distance.
51

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Figure 21 Holes and Dense Placement Areas of the CDMA Match Filter
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The designer also should try to use cells that locate at different logic paths.

Figure 22 FPGA Cell Selection Strategy

Figure 22 shows the logic structure o f an IP. We need to use some o f the cells in this EP to
embed the watermark. In order to reduce the timing delay as much as possible, we need,to
select the cells smartly. Suppose the modification o f the cells (al, bl...) in this IP will
introduce equal amount of timing delay Td to the final layout implementation. We should
firstly use the cells locate on different path in parallel. For this case, we can use a l, b l,
c l, ..., h i. Then we use a2, b2, c 2 ,..., h2. Then we will use a3, b3, c3, ..., h3. Finally we
will use a6, b6, c6, ..., h6. The reason for this selection method is that the timing delay
happening within the serial path will accumulate according to addition relation. And it
will increase the total delay continuously. If we use a l, a2 and a3, we will get 3Td for the
52
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final timing delay increase. But if we use a l, bl and c l, we will have Td only for the final
timing delay increase. For digital logic design, the final maxim working frequency is
decided by the slowest path's maxim timing delay. This makes us to use cells for
watermarking in parallel instead o f in serial. But the fact is every IP design and its FPGA
implementation is different, the effect o f moving the cells will be different. This makes
the problem more complicated. But from the simulation results, most o f the cells'
movements happen within 2 slices' distance, so this method still has its value to some
extent.

The designer should try to use small layout modules instead o f big and solid layout cells.
There is relationship between the layout design style and the watermarking difficulty. The
higher the hardware usage percentage, the more difficult the watermarking procedure will
be. When the FPGA hardware usage percentage increases, we will have less spare layout
slices for re-assignment o f those watermark cells. And we need to move slices with
longer distance to find the locations that satisfy the watermarking embedding rules. The
worst case is that 100% o f the FPGA slices have been used. We have no way but try to
swap the locations o f the FPGA layout cells to re-assign the watermark cells. If we use
big and solid layout cells, for example, the layout module that occupies 16 slices and can
not be separated or re-placed and re-routed, we will have to overpass those large blocks
during watermarking. And the average slice movement distance will increase. This will
cause worse timing performance. In figure 23,we can see some kind o f large and solid
layout cells like carry-chain and shift-register-chain. When we carry the watermarking
operations, we need to overpass these cells to find the available new slices to assign the
cells for watermarking. This increases the watermarking difficulty.
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Figure 23 FIR Filter Placement Diagram with Pre-solidified Layout Modules
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The designer should try to find the slice to assign the watermarking component (register,
for example) within one slice distance from the optimized location. If there is more than
one slice candidate available, for fast embedding, he should arbitrarily choose one. For
best result, he should try all the available candidates and run implementation for each
case and select the best one. If he cannot find the available slice within one slice distance,
he should try to find such a slice within two slices distance away from the optimized slice
location. Such kind o f search should be carried until one slice has been found or the
search

area has touched the boundary o f FPGA chip. This means the search step has

failed. Under this condition, the designer may use cell swap technology to solve the
problem. The designer should try to avoid using the components that are large logic
blocks like multipliers. We should use those small components like gates or latches that
can be implemented within single FPGA slice. The designer should also try to avoid
using the components that are located on the critical path.

We have two different after-watermarking placement flows for the FPGA cell locations
watermarking scheme after layout cell's selection.
The steps for first one are:
1.Place and route the original FPGA IP. 2.Select the cells we prefer to use for
54
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watermarking. 3.Re-assign layout slice locations for these cells that have not been used
by the original placement. Tell the place and route tool "do not touch all cells" during
following implementation process. So the place and route tool will not change the
locations o f other cells that have not been selected for watermarking. 4.Run the
implementation flow again and get the final layout with watermark.

The steps for second one are:
1.Place and route the original FPGA IP. 2.Select the cells we prefer to use for
watermarking. 3.Re-assign layout slice locations for these cells, without considering these
locations have been used by the original placement or not. In this step, the designer only
use the smallest slice movement rule to make the selection. Tell the place and route tool
"do not touch these watermarked cells" during implementation process. Let the place and
route optimization tool to decide whether change the locations o f other cells that have not
been selected for watermarking or not. The optimization goal is timing. 4.Run the
implementation flow again and get the final layout with watermark.

The difference between the first and second one is whether we allow the tool to change
the locations o f the cells that we do not use for watermarking. If time is allowed, the
designer can try both methods and select the one with better timing implementation
results.

4.5. Watermarking Performance Analysis
Embedding Efficiency: 2 bits/cell. Since we can embed 2 bits to one FPGA cells' x and y
coordinates.
Embedding Cost: The embedding o f watermark by assign FPGA cells with new locations
is simple and fast. The designer can use the FPGA placement tool to carry this operation.
No extra software is needed.
Design Overhead: For the 8-bit watermark and the FIR filter with 8 taps, the timing
increase is 1.1% and the hardware cost increase is 0.2% (Virtex-II device case).
Extraction Cost: The extraction o f the watermark within the FPGA layout is fast and
simple. We can use the design tool to load in the FPGA layout data after place and route,
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as well as the original design schematic files. Then we can use the search function o f the
FPGA CAD tool to find the locations o f the cells we have used for watermarking from
schematic diagram. Then by using the embedding rules we can extract the watermark
information from the cells' layout locations. The time to extract 8 bits o f watermark from
the FIR filter layout is less than 5 minutes and no extra software is needed.
Probability o f Coincidence (Pu): This figure is decided by watermark length. For 128-bit
watermark, the probability o f coincidence is: l/(2A128)=3.4*10A(-38).
Security Strength:

For anyone who wishes to detect/remove/modify/forgery the

watermark information, they have several ways to do the attack. The first way is to
observe the FPGA layout directly and try to find the watermark inside the FPGA layout.
This method is quite difficult with today's FPGA processing technology. The reason is by
using this method the optical microscope must be used to take the photos o f the FPGA
layouts or using reverse analysis CAD tools to analysis the FPGA layouts. But the optical
microscopes cannot easily be used to observe the layouts that are fabricated under 0.5um
technology, which is the observation limit of normal optical microscopes. (The
observation limit o f optical microscopes is decided by the visible light's wavelength. By
using shorter wavelength's light, like x-ray, the observation limit o f the microscope can be
extended. But such kind o f x-ray microscopes are much more expensive. For today's
FPGA technology, most products are fabricated using 0.13um technology and the most
advanced devices using 0.09um technology, like IBM and Xilinx's products.) Even the
attacker can find more advanced technology that allows them to observe the FPGA
layouts directly; they also cannot see the logics under 5 levels o f metal wirings. And not
like ASICs, the wiring o f FPGAs is naturally very messy, as we can see from the layout
after place and route. So technically the reverse engineering by optical observation of
FPGA layouts is really difficult.

The second way the attacker can select is to attack the FPGA programming data and try to
reverse out the logic netlist, do the place and route again, with new location constrains.
By this way they can remove the embedded watermark within FPGA layout. By doing so,
the attacker firstly need to break the 3-key 128-bit AES encryption algorithm. There is no
known efficient enough algorithm to break AES encryption algorithm so far. Even the
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attacker can find the keys and can recover the original FPGA programming data; they still
need to extract the logic netlist by using the FPGA programming binary data. Since the
FPGA programming data only provide the connection information o f the FPGA, the
attacker need the detail format knowledge o f the FPGA bit-stream data to extract the logic
netlist from the FPGA programming bit -stream data.

The FPGA factories keep this kind o f knowledge confidential and do not expose to the
public. And there is no hanker tool have been reported so far that can reverse the FPGA
programming data to logic netlist by 100%. Some tools can reverse the logic netlist from
FPGA programming bit-streams to 80% o f the whole logic within reasonable computer
hours. And the rest 15% is very difficult to extract and the final 5% is nearly impossible
to extract.
Applied Area This method can be applied to FPGA implementations o f DSP algorithms
Filter or DSP Algorithm Performance Degradation’. There will not be any filter
performance degradation, since we do not change the algorithm o f the filter or DSP
algorithms.
Probability o f Detection Miss (Pm): From the watermark detection procedure, we can see
that the probability o f a detection miss is 0. Since by providing the complete design files
including the logic netlist and placement files, route files, the watermark extractor can
always extract the watermark by using the search and debug functions o f the FPGA
design tool.
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Table 13 Comparisons Between FPGA Cell Location Watermarking and
State-of-art FPGA/ASIC Implementation Watermarking Methods
Using

Bit-stream

Hierarchical

Watermark

Finger-

Proposal

Spare

Data

Watermark

ing by Using

mark-ing

Two

LUT

Modifica

ing

Protocols

tion

Add Level

Layout

Layout

RTL

RTL

Layout

Layout

Embedding

Medium

Medium

High

Medium

High

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

Medium

High

Low

Medium

High

High

High

Low

Medium

Low

Low

Low

Low

Medium

Low

Security

Low

High

High

Medium

Low

High

Applied

FPGA

FPGA

ASIC

ASIC

ASIC

FPGA

(digital)

(digital)

(mix-

Cost
Design
Overhead
Extraction
Cost
Probability
of
Coincidence

Area

signal)

The proposed FPGA cell locations' watermarking scheme shows good watermarking
performance comparing with current ASIC/FPGA watermarking schemes. Since the
watermark is added at layout level, the lowest level o f FPGA design, the robustness o f
watermark has been improved. The design overhead is low since the watermarking
procedure is carried after the original design has been finished. The extraction cost is not
that high, because the person to extract the watermark can use the search function o f the
FPGA design CAD tool. The probability o f coincidence is quite low due to the large
amount o f watermark information we can embed into the FPGA layout. And no extra
software is required for the watermark embedding and extraction, making this scheme fit
for companies wish to watermark their design without buying new software. All in all, the
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proposed FPGA cell location's watermarking scheme shows good overall watermarking
performance and may be commercially used for protection o f today's FPGA designs.
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Chapter 5: Summary o f Contributions and
Possible Future Work
In this thesis, two new watermarking schemes have been proposed. The first one is the
filter coefficient modification watermarking. This scheme embeds watermark information
into the filter's coefficients. The watermarked filter's coefficients are then embedded into
the FPGA design by hardwiring or ROM programming. The second proposal is the FPGA
layout cell locations' watermarking. This method embeds the watermark information into
the FPGA cells' layout location coordinates. The simulation results show that the both
schemes have relatively high performance and are very suitable for practical FPGA IP
copyright protection.

The main contributions can be summarized as follows:
•

Have extended the still image watermarking method o f the pixel’s LSB
modification to filter and other DSP algorithms (at algorithm and lower levels).
We have shown that the new method has much high security strength since the
watermarked data can be hardwired or written into ROM.

•

Have proposed a novel FPGA layout cell location watermarking scheme that can
be used for FPGA design IP protection. It has been shown by the simulation
results the proposed scheme has better watermarking performance, extremely low
overheads and high security strength, compared to the previous FPGA methods.

•

Have made in depth state-of-art literature survey in the areas o f IP protection and
watermarking technology.

Future work may include ASIC layout watermarking, FPGA watermark embedding
optimization, printed circuit board (PCB) designs' protection, and FPGA/ASIC place and
route algorithms that integrate watermark embedding and optimization procedures.
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Appendix A Timing Report for the FIR Filter's Original Implementation
Release 4.2i - Trace E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved.
tree -e 3 -1 3 -xml top top.ned -o top.twr top.pcf
Design file:
top.ned
Physical constraint file: top.pcf
Device, speed :
xc2v250,-6 (ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02)
Report level:
error report
Timing constraint: Default period analysis
16528 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Minimum period is 9.289ns._________________________________
Timing constraint: Default net enumeration
1726 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Maximum net delay is 4.441ns.
All constraints were met.
Data Sheet report:
All values displayed in nanoseconds (ns)
Setup/Hold to clock m ultiplierclk
+
+
+
| Setup to | Hold to |
Source Pad
elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
------------------+_ -------------+ .. ----------- +
multipler_sclr
xn<0>
|
xn<10>
|
x n < ll>
j
xn<12>
j
xn<13>
xn<14>
j
xn<15>
|
xn< l>
|
xn<2>
xn<3>
j
xn<4>
|
xn<5>
|
xn<6>
j
xn<7>
|
xn<8>
j
xn<9>
j

2.836(R)|
0.432(R)|
0.350(R)|
0.169(R)
0.846(R)
0.770(R)|
0.440(R)|
0.085(R)|
-0.319(R)|
0.281(R)|
0.460(R)|
-0.567(R)|
-0.572(R)|
0.563(R)|
-0.386(R)|
-0.151 (R)J
-0.119(R)|

. + ................................. —

0.660(R)|
0.000(R)|
0.000(R)|
0.013(R)|
0.000(R)|
0.000(R)
0.000(R)|
0.097(R)
0.501(R)|
0.000(R)|
0.000(R)|
0.749(R)|
0.754(R)|
0.000(R)|
0.568(R)|
0.333(R)|
0.301 (R)|

+ ..........................................+

Setup/Hold to clock xlxn_150
+
+

+
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Setup to | Hold to
| elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
----------------------------+ ----- ------- +
xlxn_138<0> | 0.017(R)| 0.165(R)[
xlxn_138<10> | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)|
-0.266(R)| 0.448(R)|
xlxn_138<ll>
xlxn_138<12> | 0.670(R)| 0.000(R)|
-0.438(R)| 0.620(R)|
xlxn_138<13>
xlxn_138<14> | 0.029(R)| 0.153(R)|
-0.475(R)| 0.657(R)|
xlxn_138<15>
xlxn_138<l> | 0.299(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_138<2> | -0.093(R)| 0.275(R)|
xlxn_138<3> | -0.340(R)| 0.522(R)|
xlxn_138<4> | -0.564(R)| 0.746(R)|
xlxn_138<5> | -0.334(R)| 0.516(R)|
xlxn_138<6> | 0.158(R)| 0.024(R)|
xlxn_138<7> | -0.385(R)| 0.567(R)|
xlxn_138<8> | -0.317(R)| 0.499(R)|
xlxn_138<9> | -0.116(R)| 0.298(R)|
xlxn_147
| 2.314(R)| 0.371(R)|
+ - ----------- + ------- ------ +
Setup/Hold to clock xn_load_clk
Source Pad

- .......................................................

—

Source Pad
xlxn_39
xlxn_44
xlxn_45
xlxn_50
xlxn_52
xlxn_54
xn<0>
xn<10>
x n < ll>
xn<12>
xn<13>
xn<14>
xn<15>
xn<l>
xn<2>
xn<3>
xn<4>
xn<5>
xn<6>
xn<7>
xn<8>

— — — ——

---------

4*

Setup to | Hold to |
| elk (edge) elk (edge)
.+------------- +_.----------- +
| 0.184(R)| 0.000(R)|
| -0.852(R)| 1.034(R)|
| -1.138(R)| 1.320(R)|
| -0.834(R)| 1.016(R)|
-0.426(R)| 0.608(R)|
| 0.186(R)| 0.000(R)|
| 0.596(R)| 0.000(R)|
| -0.359(R)| 0.541 (R)|
0.456(R)| 0.000(R)|
1 -0.114(R)| 0.296(R)|
| 0.397(R)| 0.000(R)|
| 0.664(R)| 0.000(R)|
| 0.592(R)| 0.000(R)|
| 0.045(R)| 0.137(R)|
| 0.731 (R)| 0.000(R)|
| 0.751 (R)| 0.000(R)|
| -0.380(R)| 0.562(R)
| -0.179(R)| 0.361 (R)|
| -0.378(R)| 0.560(R)|
| -0.090(R)| 0.272(R)|
| 0.146(R)| 0.036(R)
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xn<9>
|
0.190(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn_preload | 1.503(R)| 1.253(R)|
xn_serial_in | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)|
---------------- -f---------------- t ---------- -h
Clock adder elk to Pad
— +-------------+
| elk (edge) |
Destination Pad| to PAD
yn<0>
yn<10>
yn<l1>
yn<12>
yn<13>
yn<14>
yn<15>
yn<16>
yn<17>
yn<18>
yn<19>
yn<l>
yn<20>
yn<21>
yn<22>
yn<23>
yn<24>
yn<25>
yn<26>
yn<27>
yn<28>
yn<29>
yn<2>
yn<30>
yn<31>
yn<3>
yn<4>
yn<5>
yn<6>
yn<7>
yn<8>
yn<9>

|
|
|
|
|
|
1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

8.597(R)|
8.855(R)|
8.671 (R)|
8.921 (R)|
8.560(R)
8.405(R)|
9.125(R)|
9.430(R)
8.860(R)|
8.736(R)|
8.698(R)|
8.633(R)|
8.653(R)|
8.586(R)|
9.175(R)
8.519(R)|
8.557(R)|
8.612(R)
8.697(R)|
8.040(R)|
8.620(R)|
8.536(R)|
8.233(R)
8.326(R)
8.988(R)|
8.449(R)|
8.567(R)
8.701(R)|
8.518(R)|
8.333(R)|
8.589(R)|
8.346(R)

Clock to Setup on destination clock adder_clk
+

+

+

+

+

| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:RisejDest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
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+ ----------- + ----------+ ----------- + ------------+

adder_clk
| 5.1511
multiplier_clk |5.431 j

|

|

|

|
|

|

+ - ------------- + -------------+ - .................+ — ..............+

Clock to Setup on destination clock multiplier_clk
+ -----------+ --------- + ---------- + ----------- +

| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
-

+ -----------+ --------- + ---------- + ----------- +

multiplier_clk | 9.3931
xlxn_150
| 3.003|
xn_load_clk | 3.135|
-

|
|

|
|

|

|
|

|

|

- + --------------+ -----------+ ------------- + ---------------+

Clock to Setup on destination clock xlxn_150
---------------

+ -------------- + ---------------- 4 - ------------------ 4-

| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
-----------------f----------- -f---- * -f-------- -f----------- +
xlxn_150
| 2.769|
|
|
|
+ ------------+ ---------+ ----------- + ------------ +

Clock to Setup on destination clock xn_load_clk
+ ------------+ ---------+ ----------- + ------------ +

| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
- + ------------- + ---------- + ------------ + --------------+

xn_load_clk

|

2.9911
|
|
|
+---------+---------- +----------WARNING:Timing:2554 - Clock nets using non-dedicated resources were found in this
design. Clock skew on these resources will not be automatically addressed during path
analysis. To create a timing report that analyzes
clock skew for these paths, run tree with the '-skew' option.
The following clock nets use non-dedicated resources:
xn_load_clk_IBUF adder_clk_IBUF multiplier_clk_IBUF
xlxn_150_IBUF
Timing summary:
Timing errors: 0 Score: 0
Constraints cover 16528 paths, 1726 nets, and 2993 connections (100.0% coverage)
Design statistics:
M inim um period: 9.289ns (M axim um frequency: 107.654MHz)
M axim um net delay: 4.441ns
Analysis completed Tue Mar 09 21:29:03 2004
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Appendix B Timing Report for the FIR Filter Implementation with 8-bit
Watermarking
Release 4.2i - Trace E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved,
tree -e 3 -1 3 -xml top top.ned -o top.twr top.pcf
Design file:
top.ned
Physical constraint file: top.pcf
Device,speed:
xc2v250,-6 (ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02)
Report level:
error report
WARNING:Timing:2491 - No timing constraints found, doing default enumeration.
Timing constraint: Default period analysis
16528 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Minimum period is 9.392ns._______________________________________________
Timing constraint: Default net enumeration
1726 items analyzed, 0 timing errors detected.
Maximum net delay is 4.441ns.
All constraints were met.
Data Sheet report:
All values displayed in nanoseconds (ns)
Setup/Hold to clock multiplier_clk
+

+

+

| Setup to | Hold to |
Source Pad | elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
----------- +
m ultiplersclr | 2.836(R) 0.660(R)|
| 0.432(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<0>
| 0.350(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<10>
| 0.169(R)| 0.013(R)|
x n < ll>
0.846(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<12>
0.770(R) 0.000(R)|
xn<13>
xn<14>
0.440(R)| 0.000(R)|
j 0.085(R) 0.097(R)|
xn<15>
| -0.319(R)| 0.501(R)|
xn<l>
xn<2>
| 0.281 (R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<3>
| 0.460(R)| 0.000(R)|
-0.567(R)| 0.749(R)|
xn<4>
| -0.572(R) 0.754(R)|
xn<5>
xn< 6>
0.563(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<7>
| -0.386(R)| 0.568(R)|
| -0.151(R)| 0.333(R)|
xn<8>
xn<9>
| -0.283(R)| 0.465(R)|
—4'——
Setup/Hold to clock xlxn_150
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— + --------------------- 4 ------------------------ f

Setup to j Hold to |
| elk (edge) | elk (edge) |
------------------+~ ----------- + ------- -------+
xlxn_138<0> | 0.017(R)| 0.165(R)|
xlxn_138<10> | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)|
xlxn_138<ll> | -0.266(R)| 0.448(R)
xlxn_138<12> | 0.838(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_138<13> | -0.423(R)| 0.605(R)|
xlxn_138<14>
-0.025(R)| 0.207(R)|
xlxn_138<15> | -0.219(R) 0.401 (R)|
xlxn_138<l> | 0.299(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_138<2> | -0.093(R)| 0.275(R)|
xlxn_138<3> | -0.424(R)| 0.606(R)
xlxn_138<4> | -0.564(R)| 0.746(R)|
xlxn_138<5> | -0.334(R) 0.516(R)
xlxn_138<6> | 0.158(R)| 0.024(R)|
xlxn_138<7> | -0.385(R)| 0.567(R)|
xlxn_138<8> | -0.317(R)| 0.499(R)|
xlxn_138<9> | -0.116(R)| 0.298(R)|
xlxn_147
| 1.321 (R)| 0.560(R)|
Source Pad

.+

+

+

Setup/Hold to clock xn_load_clk
+
+
+
| Setup to | Hold to |
Source Pad
elk (edge) | elk (edge)
------------------------ +. -----------------+ . . --------------- +
xlxn_39
| 0.184(R)| 0.000(R)|
xlxn_44
j -0.852(R)| 1.034(R)|
xlxn_45
| -1.138(R)| 1.320(R)
xlxn_50
j -0.834(R)| 1.016(R)|
xlxn_52
j -0.426(R)| 0.608(R)|
xlxn_54
j -0.319(R)j 0.501 (R)|
xn<0>
| 0.596(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<10>
| -0.359(R)| 0.541 (R)|
x n < ll>
| 0.456(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<12>
j -0.114(R)| 0.296(R)|
xn<13>
| 0.397(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<14>
| 0.664(R)| 0.000(R)
xn<15>
| 0.592(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn< l>
| 0.045(R)| 0.137(R)|
xn<2>
| 0.731 (R)| 0.000(R)
xn<3>
j 1.185(R)| 0.000(R)|
xn<4>
| -0.380(R)| 0.562(R)|
xn<5>
| -0.179(R)| 0.361 (R)|
xn<6>
j -0.378(R)| 0.560(R)|
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xn<7>
| -0.090(R)| 0.272(R)|
xn<8>
| 0.146(R)| 0.036(R)|
xn<9>
| 0.156(R)| 0.026(R)|
xn_preload |
1.675(R)| 1.253(R)|
xn_serial_in | -0.008(R)| 0.190(R)|
+-------------+------------ +
Clock adder_clk to Pad
+------------- +
| elk (edge)|
Destination Pad| to PAD
.+ ------------ +
| 8.597(R)|
yn<0>
| 8.855(R)|
yn<10>
yn<l1>
| 8.671(R)|
| 8.921 (R)|
yn<12>
| 8.560(R)
yn<13>
yn<14>
| 8.405(R)|
yn<15>
1 9 .125(R)|
9.430(R)|
yn<16>
| 8.860(R)|
yn<17>
| 8.736(R)
yn<18>
| 8.698(R)|
yn<19>
| 8.633(R)|
yn< l>
| 8.653(R)|
yn<20>
| 8.586(R)|
yn<21>
yn<22>
1 9.175(R)|
yn<23>
| 8.519(R)|
8.557(R) j
yn<24>
| 8.612(R)|
yn<25>
| 8.697(R)|
yn<26>
| 8.040(R)|
yn<27>
| 8.620(R)|
yn<28>
| 8.536(R)|
yn<29>
yn<2>
| 8.233(R)|
| 8.326(R)|
yn<30>
| 8.988(R)|
yn<31>
| 8.449(R)|
yn<3>
| 8.567(R)|
yn<4>
| 8.701(R)|
yn<5>
| 8.518(R)j
yn<6>
yn<7>
| 8.333(R)|
| 8.589(R)|
yn<8>
| 8.346(R)|
yn<9>
.+

+

Clock to Setup on destination clock adder_clk
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------------------------------+ ----------------- + ------------------+ ------------------ -f--------------------+

| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
+---------- + ---------- + ---------- + ----------- +

adder_clk
| 5.1511
|
|
|
multiplier_clk | 5.4311
|
|
|
+----------+---------- +---------- +---------- +
Clock to Setup on destination clock multiplier_clk
+ ---------- + ---------- + ---------- + ----------- +
| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
+----------+---------- + ----------+---------- +
multiplier_clk | 9.3931
|
|
|
xlxn_150
| 3.003|
|
|
|
xn_load_clk | 3.187|
|
|
|
+----------+---------- +---------- +---------- +
Clock to Setup on destination clock xlxn_150
+ ---------- + ---------- + ---------- + -----------+

| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
+----------+---------- +---------- +---------- +
xlxn_150
| 2.787J
|
|
|
+----------+---------- +---------- +---------- +
Clock to Setup on destination clock xn_load_clk
+ ---------- + ---------- + ---------- + ----------- +

| Src:Rise| Src:Fall| Src:Rise| Src:Fall|
Source Clock |Dest:Rise|Dest:Rise|Dest:Fall|Dest:Fall|
+ ---------- + -----------+ ----------- + ----------- +

xn_load_clk |
------------------ 4-—

2.804|

|

|

|

-----“I*— —-----+ ---------- 4-— --------4-

WARNING: Timing: 2554 - Clock nets using non-dedicated resources were found in this
design. Clock skew on these resources will not be automatically addressed during path
analysis. To create a timing report that analyzesclock skew for these paths, run tree with
the '-skew' option.The following clock nets use non-dedicated resources:
xn_load_clk_IBUF adder_clk_IBUF multiplier_clk_IBUF
xlxn_150_IBUF
Timing summary:______________________________________________________________
Timing errors: 0 Score: 0
Constraints cover 16528 paths, 1726 nets, and 2995 connections (100.0% coverage)
Design statistics:
M inim um period: 9.392ns (M axim um frequency: 106.474MHz)
M axim um net delay: 4.441ns
Analysis completed Tue Mar 09 21:43:53 2004
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Appendix C Place and Route Report Before Watermarking of FIR Filter
Release 4.2i - Par E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved.
Tue Mar 09 21:26:49 2004
par -f _par.rsp
Constraints file: top.pcf
Loading design for application par from file par_temp.ncd.
"top" is an NCD, version 2.37, device xc2v250, package csl44, speed -6
Loading device for application par from file '2v250.nph' in environment
D:/Xilinx.
Device speed data version: ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02.
Device utilization summary:
Number o f External IOBs
78 out o f 92 84%
Number o f LOCed External IOBs 0 out o f 78
0%
Number o f MULT 18X18s
Number of SLICEs

8 out o f 24 33%
488 out o f 1536 31 %

Overall effort level (-ol): 5 (set by user)
Placer effort level (-pi): 5 (set by user)
Placer cost table entry (-t): 1
Router effort level (-rl): 5 (set by user)
Extra effort level (-xe): 0 (set by user)
Starting Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 12 secs
Finished Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 12 secs
Automatic resolution o f clock placement was successful.
It was not necessary to constrain the placement o f any o f the logic driven by
the global clocks with the current clock placement.______________________
## Automatic clock placement completed.
Starting clustering phase. REAL time: 13 secs
Finished clustering phase. REAL time: 15 secs
Starting Mincut Placer. REAL time: 15 secs
Finished Mincut Placer. REAL time: 16 secs
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Total REAL time to Placer completion: 54 secs
Total CPU time to Placer completion: 53 secs
0 connection(s) routed; 2993 unrouted active, 7 unrouted PWR/GND.
Starting router resource preassignment
Completed router resource preassignment. REAL time: 55 secs
Starting iterative routing.
Routing active signals.
71
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End o f iteration 1
3000 successful; 0 unrouted; (0) REAL time: 1 mins 15 secs
Total REAL time: 1 mins 15 secs
Total CPU time: 1 mins 15 secs
End o f route. 3000 routed (100.00%); 0 unrouted.
No errors found.
Completely routed.
This design was run without timing constraints. It is likely that much better
circuit performance can be obtained by trying either or both o f the following:
- Enabling the Delay Based Cleanup router pass, if not already enabled
- Supplying timing constraints in the input design

Total REAL time to Router completion: 1 mins 16 secs
Total CPU time to Router completion: 1 mins 16 secs
Generating PAR statistics.
The Delay Summary Report
The Score for this design is: 169
The Number o f signals not completely routed for this design is: 0
The Average Connection Delay for this design is:
1.182 ns
The Maximum Pin Delay is:
4.441 ns
The Average Connection Delay on the 10 Worst Nets is: 2.576 ns
Listing Pin Delays by value: (ns)
d < 1.00 < d <2. 00 < d < 3.00 < d < 4 . 0 0 < d < 5 . 0 0 d > = 5 . 0 0
1253

1421

223

93

10

0

Dumping design to file top.ned.

All signals are completely routed.
Total REAL time to PAR completion: 1 mins 24 secs
Total CPU time to PAR completion: 1 mins 23 secs
Placement: Completed - No errors found.
Routing: Completed - No errors found.
PAR done.
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Appendix D Place and Route Report of FIR Filter with 8-bit Watermark
Release 4.2i - Par E.35
Copyright (c) 1995-2001 Xilinx, Inc. All rights reserved.

Tue Mar 09 21:38:33 2004
par -f _par.rsp

Constraints file: top.pcf
Loading design for application par from file p artem p.ncd.
"top" is an NCD, version 2.37, device xc2v250, package csl44, speed -6
Loading device for application par from file '2v250.nph' in environment
D:/Xilinx.
Device speed data version: ADVANCED 1.96 2002-01-02.
Device utilization summary:
Number o f External IOBs
78 out o f 92 84%
Number o f LOCed External IOBs 78 out o f 78 100%
Number o f M ULTI 8X18s
8 out o f 24 33%
Number of SLICEs
489 out o f 1536 31%
Overall effort level (-ol): 5 (set by user)
Placer effort level (-pi): 5 (set by user)
Placer cost table entry (-t): 1
Router effort level (-rl): 5 (set by user)
Extra effort level (-xe): 0 (set by user)
Starting Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 23 secs
Finished Clock Logic Placement. REAL time: 23 secs
Automatic resolution o f clock placement was successful.
It was not necessary to constrain the placement o f any o f the logic driven by
the global clocks with the current clock placement.______________________
## Automatic clock placement completed.
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Starting Optimizing Placer. REAL time: 29 secs
Optimizing
Swapped 0 comps.
Xilinx Placer [1] 301752 REAL time: 30 secs
Finished Optimizing Placer. REAL time: 30 secs
Dumping design to file top.ned.
Total REAL time to Placer completion: 31 secs
Total CPU time to Placer completion: 30 secs
73
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0 connection(s) routed; 2995 unrouted active, 7 unrouted PWR/GND.
Starting router resource preassignment
Completed router resource preassignment. REAL time: 32 secs
Starting iterative routing.
Routing active signals.
End o f iteration 1
3002 successful; 0 unrouted; (0) REAL time: 52 secs
Total REAL time: 52 secs
Total CPU time: 52 secs
End o f route. 3002 routed (100.00%); 0 unrouted.
No errors found.
Completely routed.
This design was run without timing constraints. It is likely that much better
Circuit performance can be obtained by trying either or both o f the following:
- Enabling the Delay Based Cleanup router pass, if not already enabled
- Supplying timing constraints in the input design

Total REAL time to Router completion: 53 secs
Total CPU time to Router completion: 52 secs
Generating PAR statistics.
The Delay Summary Report
The Score for this design is: 167
The Number o f signals not completely routed for this design is: 0
The Average Connection Delay for this design is: 1.179 ns
The Maximum Pin Delay is: 4.441 ns
The Average Connection Delay on the 10 W orst Nets is: 2.463 ns
Listing Pin Delays by value; (ns)
d < 1.00 < d <2. 00 < d <3. 00 < d < 4 . 0 0 < d < 5 . 0 0 d > = 5 . 0 0
1251

1425

225

91

10

0

Dumping design to file top.ned
All signals are completely routed.
Total REAL time to PAR completion: 1 mins
Total CPU time to PAR completion: 59 secs
Placement: Completed - No errors found.
Routing: Completed - No errors found.
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Appendix E Layout of Comb Filter Before and After Watermarking
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Appendix F Layout of CDMA Match Filter Before and After W atermarking
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Appendix G Layout of DCT Before and After Watermarking
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